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ABSTRACT

GARIVALTIS, LELAND

Reconstructing the Concept of Terrorism After
9/11: The case of FARC-EP in Colombia

Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- Ejército del Pueblo (FARCEP) is a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group that formed in the rural sections of Colombia in
1966. The guerilla group has claimed to fight for the marginalized Colombian. Because
this insurgent group disrupts the status quo, more recent hardliner governments of
Colombia and the United States have vilified the organization publicly to denounce the
legitimacy and goals of the Leftist guerillas as well as labeled them terrorists and narcoterrorists.
This thesis provides analysis and research to negate the comparison between the
rural guerilla fighters and terrorist organizations, while it also provides evidence that
challenges such ongoing policies and tactics of Colombia and the U.S. against the FARCEP. The term “terrorism” will be examined critically to uncover the lack of legitimacy
that, today, surrounds this over politicized idea. In addition, the insistence on violence as
a political mechanism in Colombian history, particularly between its main political
parties, will contextualize the FARC-EP’s tactics and emergence as a political and
military player in the battle between Leftist insurgent groups and both the armed forces
and the paramilitaries of Colombia.
Three seemingly random and unconnected chapters will be integrated in order to
provide an intrinsic and authentic understanding behind the ideology, tactics, structure
and support of the FARC-EP. In order to argue against mainstream media and influential
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governments, deep analysis and sufficient evidence needs to be uncovered and
established. To provide an alternate depiction of the Leftist guerillas, this thesis had to
investigate beyond information solely attributed to the FARC-EP. Instead, it must begin
with an understanding and dissection of the political and economic strife in Colombia
since its independence. As discovered, the incessant violence in the country displayed by
unrest between political parties of the Liberals and Conservatives is the primary cause for
the outbreak of La Violencia and consequently the creation of guerilla republics.
After analysis of Colombia’s violent past, the subsequent topic of unjust labeling
of the FARC-EP as “terrorists” is confronted. This section scrutinizes the transformation
of the once tactical strategy to its present day recognition as a global fear due to the
attacks of September 11. Lastly, in order to unravel the reasoning behind U.S. and
Colombian designation of the guerillas as “terrorists,” research moves towards
uncovering the underlying motives behind U.S. policy in Colombia. Plan Colombia is
dissected to discover the implications of economic gains beyond that of the proclaimed
“War on Drugs.” The aggressive positions taken by the Colombian and U.S.
governments against the FARC-EP have been publicly justified by the claims of counternarcotics, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, but in reality, economics drive the
implementation of such policies and the calumny of the insurgency.
Through personal accounts of both hostages and combatants, primary interviews,
governmental documents, field journalism, researched secondary accounts, news sources
and personal interviews research comes together to defend the marginalized fight against
the status quo. In addition, historical accounts have been compared and analyzed as well
as modern implications towards the same topic of the FARC-EP’s struggle for equality.
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LASO
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Irish Republican Army
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Irish Republican Brotherhood

M-19

19th of April Movement

PCC (CCP)

Colombian Communist Party

PSR

Revolutionary Socialist Party

UN

United Nations

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNCHR

United Nations Commission on Human Rights

UNIR

National Leftist Revolution Union

USD

United States Dollar

WWF

World Wildlife Fund
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PREFACE

In 1982, at the Seventh Conference of Guerrilla Movement, Las Fuerzas
Revolucionarias de Colombia advocated for the development of new strategies to take on
more offensive military tactics and broaden their support base. As a result, Ejército del
Pueblo (People’s Army) was added to the insurgency’s title. Thus, prior to 1982 the
organization will be referred to as the FARC, and afterwards it will be referenced as the
FARC-EP. 1
The FARC developed out of civil society in the midst of violence and chaos in
Colombia. The time in which the guerillas formed is not only important because of the
movement that emerged, but because it was the culmination of violence found among the
disputing parties and dejected citizens. Such violence has not seemed to subside in
Colombia, and thus the nation is still entrenched in a long, violent civil war. Therefore, it
is important to begin with Colombian history, from Spanish colonization to the death of
the prominent presidential-hopeful Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. It is essential to understanding
not only why the FARC emerged but also to comprehend the current violent situation
within Colombia. This violence is not solely attributed to the FARC-EP, but to other
Leftist guerillas, right-wing paramilitaries, and the armed forces of the government as
well. The civil war in Colombia is vast and complicated. Thus, a sole analysis of the
FARC-EP, their structure, goals, projects and actions would not have any purpose
without the context of the violent country, the dueling political parties or a grasp of the
immense socio-economic inequality.

1

James J. Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: the Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP.
(London: Pluto, 2010), 25.
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Secondly, understanding guerilla insurgencies is a feat in itself. When combined
with a hegemonic power of the United States that has a newly profound conception of
terrorism, life as a militant Leftist organization that directly opposes the status quo is
increasingly consequential. The FARC-EP has therefore faced the scrutiny of both
foreign and internal policy aimed and created to dismantle and discredit them.
Furthermore, popular media’s portrayal of the insurgency highlights and deliberately
discredits the social movement. Both Colombian and United States’ administrations have
used “counter narcotics,” “counter insurgency” and “anti-terrorist” rationales to
implement policies and obtain monetary means to fight the FARC-EP. The preferred
result of these policies is to devastate the organization under the pretext of national
security. However, while the aforementioned grounds for combat and intervention are
legitimate ploys in the eyes of the public, the underlying motivations are in actuality
directly connected to economic and political objectives; they do not connote national
security.
These unscrupulous policies of the Colombian and United States’ governments
are found overwhelmingly in Plan Colombia, on a variety of levels. Since the
implementation of the Plan under the Pastrana administration until today, billions of
dollars have been spent on military operations and tactics rather than on substitute-crop
implementation and resources for the rural farmers. In addition, there is ample evidence
that connects U.S. policy in Colombia with U.S. corporations’ economic interests in
natural resources. United States’ investments and interests in Colombian resources and
economics serve as fuel to vilify and publicly denounce the Leftist insurgency.
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Finally, the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 have
consequently given the U.S. much leeway in their designation of foreign “terrorist”
organizations. The term has entered global society and in the process the meaning and
connotation of the term has altered. It has become the “red scare” of the recent decade.
As a result, U.S. foreign policy has used the fight against “terrorism” to implement power
abroad. In conclusion, the labeling of the FARC-EP as “terrorists” or “narco-terrorists”
is a politically charged allegation, which can be negated by the historical context of
Colombia, the guerilla tactics and formation of the insurgency as well as its ideology.
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CHAPTER ONE

Understanding the FARC-EP: When Diplomacy Fails…
Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- Ejército del Pueblo (FARCEP) is a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group that formed in the rural sections of Colombia in
1966. The insurgency was created in order to support the increasing population of the
countryside that suffered from the lack of land reform and the constraints of the
Conservative party of 1946. The country’s Liberal and Conservative parties were in
constant dispute, and from this conflict came the period known as La Violencia where
more than 200,000 people lost their lives primarily during the years from 1948 to 1958. 1
The violence broke out after the assassination of the prominent lawyer and popular land
reformer, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. As riots ensued and the Liberals and Conservatives
fought for years in the countryside, Manuel Marulanda Vélez, also known as Tirofijo, and
Jacobo Arenas imagined and created the FARC in order to aid agrarian society and the
rural poor of the ungoverned and forgotten territories. 2
The media along with the United States and Colombian governments have twisted
the line between guerrilla fighters and terrorists to portray the insurgency as the latter.
This thesis will provide fair analysis and research to negate the comparison between the
rural guerilla fighters and terrorist organizations. The term “terrorism” will also be
confronted and analyzed to uncover the lack of legitimacy that today surrounds the over
politicized idea. Furthermore, the use of violence and its prevalence since Colombia’s
1

Harvey F. Kline, Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: The Peace Process of Colombian President Andrés
Pastrana (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2007), 8.
2
Alfredo Molano, "The evolution of the FARC: A guerrilla group's long history," NACLA Report on the
Americas 34: 2 (2000), 23-31 (http://www.proquest.com), Jan. 15, 2011.
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Independence among political parties and disputing territories will contextualize the
FARC-EP’s tactics.
According to James Brittain, a professor and author of Revolutionary Social
Change in Colombia, state-based reports, scholastic papers and popular media accounts
have hypothesized the FARC-EP’s involvement in the coca industry and the drug trade
while demonizing the group as a terrorist organization.3 However, through interviews
with supporters, leaders and local farmers over the past several years, he unravels the
truths behind the FARC-EP’s connections with coca production, the drug trade, money
laundering and their political and military systems. Furthermore, he provides evidence
and arguments that demonstrate the FARC-EP’s commitment to their ideology and fight
for social equality for the Colombian rural and urban working class populations. It
should also be noted that the guerilla’s means of income have in recent years intensified
along with those of the paramilitary groups.
In connection with Brittain’s findings, the author of Beyond Bogotá: Diary of a
Drug War Journalist in Colombia, Garry Leech, an independent journalist and editor of
colombiajournal.org, reports from inside FARC-EP territories and proclaims the desire
and perfunctory actions of the organization to continue on the path of social equality.
Leech has spent years in conflict zones in Colombia, and these experiences allow for
insight into the insurgency. He reiterates the importance of Colombia’s history and the
prevalence of violence that plagues it. While his accounts recognize the violent acts of
the FARC-EP, he understands the inequalities that persist and the struggle of the people

3

Brittain, 89.
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who live outside of Bogotá as well as the purpose of the guerillas fight. 4 Leech provides
a well-researched and knowledgeable base of the violence and issues that are prominent
in Colombia. Furthermore, he is critical of U.S. involvement in the country, especially in
regards to Plan Colombia. 5
To further discover the path and trabajo of the organization, other personal
narratives such as former guerilla María Eugenia Vásquez Perdomo’s memoir, My Life as
a Colombian Revolutionary, will be dissected and used to reflect on the inner workings of
the FARC-EP and the relationships, roles, daily life and goals of the organization. To act
as a contrast, retellings of kidnapped peoples, mainly U.S. citizens and Colombian elites,
will be examined and analyzed in search of governmental or media influences. These
accounts will simultaneously serve to acknowledge the use of force that does in fact exist
within the organization. Ingrid Betancourt’s Even Silence Has an End: My Six Years of
Captivity in the Colombian Jungle coupled with U.S. citizens Marc Gonsalves, Tom
Howes and Keith Stansell’s Out of Captivity: Surviving 1,967 Days in the Colombian
Jungle are primary sources referenced to illustrate a comparative image of the guerillas.
They provide an alternative depiction of the insurgency; they demonstrate the violent and
desperate side of the FARC-EP that enables them to take arms and hostages in order to
contend with and ameliorate their position with the Colombian government.

Drug Connection—Paramilitary Presence
The primary misconception, as developed and promoted mainly by mass media
and both the U.S. and Colombian governments, is the insurgency’s association with the
4

Garry Leech, interview by Josh Rushing, After Words with Garry Leech, C-SPAN, Feb. 11, 2009
(http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/284132-1).
5
After Words with Garry Leech

3

drug trade. From this association, the label of “narco-terrorists” is now commonly
associated with the group. Though there is immense speculation and information that
connects the FARC-EP with the drug industry, their connection with coca production
does not justify the insurgency’s classification as a terrorist organization. Furthermore,
the recent surge in the FARC-EP’s involvement with cocaine is due to the need to
compete with the country’s paramilitaries that are heavily imbedded in the drug
industry. 6

Previously, the FARC-EP protected coca-growing peasants while they taxed

the dealers. 7 According to James Petras, a professor of sociology at Binghamton
University, in 2002, former president Andrés Pastrana admitted, “contrary to U.S. State
Department propaganda, the FARC neither produces or sells coca or drugs.” 8 Again,
authors such as Petras, Brittain and Leech discuss the actualities of the FARC-EP’s
association with drugs, violence and crime. Although, it should be noted that much of
their research is outdated and the insurgency has made changes to their policies towards
the drug trade, it is all relative to the other conflicting Colombian powers. Furthermore,
the work of Brittain, Leech and Petras denotes different ideas than those of the U.S. State
Department.
For example, Leech says, “if FARC leaders are little more than the heads of a
criminal organization, then they must be considered miserable failures,” meaning that the
FARC-EP members do not live in luxury like the paramilitaries and notorious drug cartel
leaders. 9

6

Adam Isacson, phone interview by author, January 20, 2011.
James Petras and Michael M. Brescia, “The FARC Faces the Empire,” Latin American Perspectives 27:5
(2000), 134 (http://jstor.org/).
8
Petras and Brescia, 134.
9
Garry M. Leech Beyond Bogotá: Diary of a Drug War Journalist in Colombia (Boston: Beacon Press,
2009), 238.
7

4

For them, it is a hard life spent sleeping on wooden planks, bathing in rivers,
fighting odd tropical diseases, coping with separation from family and loved ones,
and constantly moving from camp to camp to avoid U.S. intelligence-gathering
efforts and the Colombian army. 10
In the 1960s, the Colombian government passed legislation that allowed for selfdefense groups to form in order to protect their assets. These types of groups developed
throughout the country, and decades later paramilitaries surfaced directly from the initial
self-defense organizations. The most well-known and powerful paramilitary that
emerged in Colombia was the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense
Forces, AUC). 11 The AUC united various self-defense organizations, many of which
previously associated with and were followers of drug lords, local political and economic
elites, as well as organized crime organizations. However different, these paramilitary
groups commonly united against the leftist FARC-EP, and confrontation between the two
has persisted for years. Although the Uribe administration claimed that paramilitaries no
longer exist due to the 2003 agreement between the his administration and the AUC to
demobilize, new branches and increasingly similar criminal groups have since formed. 12
The AUC, which has connections with the Colombian army and government, is
responsible for the victimization of Colombian citizens. They have displaced indigenous
communities from their land, massacred civilians, and kidnapped political figures. 13
Brittain cites a piece written by a U.S. citizen who found herself in both paramilitary and
FARC-EP territories. She recounts that at paramilitary check points, one is interrogated,
searched, intimidated and harassed. She mentions stories of rape, theft and terrorization
10

Leech, Beyond Bogotá, 238.
Stephanie Hanson, "Colombia's Right-Wing Paramilitaries and Splinter Groups," Council on Foreign
Relations,http://www.cfr.org/publication/15239/colombias_rightwing_paramilitaries_and_splinter_groups.
html#p2. (Jan. 22, 2011).
12
Hanson, "Colombia's Right-Wing Paramilitaries and Splinter Groups."
13
Hanson, "Colombia’s Right-Wing Paramilitaries and Splinter Groups."
11

5

by government forces. Whereas on the other hand, when she discusses the FARCEP, she says she was welcomed and never threatened. 14 In the end, the paramilitaries
have closer connections with both the U.S. and Colombian governments; yet, they are
openly and directly linked to the drug trade and violence. They partake in assassinations
as well as kidnappings.
Violence in Colombia is present and prevalent beyond the guerilla groups, both
the government and the paramilitaries have histories of violence and human rights
violations. In the Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2010, the section designated to
the guerilla groups, FARC and the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation
Army, ELN) is significantly shorter than the sections allotted for paramilitary and
government violations. The violations listed for the FARC are massacres, killings,
threats, and recruitment of child combatants as well as the use of landmines. The FARCEP has been responsible for massacres and abuses against the Afro-Colombian and
Indigenous populations. 15 Though the FARC-EP’s violations are unacceptable, in
comparison with competing forces their misconduct in actuality is at least contextualized.
The report notes that, on the other hand, the violations of the paramilitaries involve drug
trafficking, active recruitment, and various abuses, including: massacres, killings, rapes,
threats, and forced displacement as well as attacks against union workers. 16 Furthermore,
the past years have shown an increase in the amount of extrajudicial killings of civilians
attributed to the Colombian army. “Army members, under pressure to show results, kill
civilians and then report them as combatants killed in action.” 17

14

Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, 32.
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2010 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), 212.
16
Human Rights Watch, 213.
17
Human Rights Watch, 214.
15
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According to Adam Isacson, Director of Programs and Latin American specialist
at the Center for International Policy, in the late nineties there was a dramatic shift in the
percentage of murders in Colombia, as the AUC was created in 1997. About seventy per
cent of the murders are attributed to the right-wing paramilitaries while the FARC-EP
was responsible for less than a quarter, leaving the government with a designated five per
cent. 18 Before the formation of the paramilitaries, the FARC-EP and the government
were equally responsible. This change in numbers establishes a clear connection between
the paramilitaries and the Colombian governments. The paramilitaries took over the
unethical and violent role in which the government would otherwise partake. 19 The
diminishing government abuses allude to the development of the paramilitaries as a
scapegoat for Colombian administrations. Accusations against Colombian congressmen
and their connections with the paramilitaries have risen. In 2006, the investigations of
more than eighty members of the Congress commenced due to these accusations
involving government collaboration with the AUC. These investigations and accusations
are known as the parapolitics scandal. However, “the Uribe administration has
repeatedly taken actions that could sabotage the investigations, including issuing public
and personal attacks against Supreme Court justices.” 20
The violence and the strength of the paramilitaries coupled with that of the
government brings forth the rationalization that the FARC-EP has taken to violent means
in order to compete with these opposing forces. They, the Leftist guerillas, have also
consequently deepened their connections with the drug trade because of the

18

Isacson phone interview, Jan. 20, 2011.
Plan Colombia: Cashing in on the Drug War Failure, DVD, directed by Gerard Ungerman and Audrey
Brohy (2002; Cinema Libre).
20
Human Rights Watch, 213.
19

7

paramilitaries’ increasing and intense association of their own. The disappearance of the
Medellín and Cali cartels, the two main and most powerful cartels of the 1970s and 80s in
Colombia, opened the FARC-EP and the AUC to association with the drug industry in
the mid 1990s. 21

Support and Structure of the FARC-EP
The FARC-EP is portrayed in negative light by the United States and Colombia,
and although the FARC-EP is present on the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center’s list
of international terrorist organizations, there is little information and analysis provided on
the highly dangerous terrorist group.
The guerilla group is oddly one of the world’s least researched politico-military
organizations. As no in-depth scholarship has been conducted on the FARC-EP’s
ideological or practical relation to contemporary social change, there is much
need for such study.” 22
More importantly, there is evidence that the guerilla group has provided aid to its
supporters and it has increasing amounts of followers especially seen in the mid 1990s to
the mid 2000s. Peasant support grew steadily throughout the mid 1960s and 70s, but the
1980s brought more significant growth as roughly one fifth of the country gave his or her
support to the organization. The guerillas expanded their control to more than sixty per
cent of the country with tangible influence in 622 municipalities, and by the end of the
decade, their influence had reached 1,000 municipalities; 23 in a few short years, ninetythree per cent of all areas had guerilla presence. The insurgency reached its peak in the
21

Arlene B. Tickner, “Colombia and the Unites States: From Counternarcotics to Counterterrorism,”
2003, in Thomas J. Badey, ed., Violence and Terrorism (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2009),
69.
22
James Petras Preface to Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: the Origin and Direction of the
FARC-EP (London: Pluto, 2010), xv.
23
Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, pg. 16
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late 1990s to the early to mid 2000s. As Isacson noted in an interview, it is difficult to
know for sure how much support for insurgency exists. Calculations published in
Brittain’s Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia affirm that in 2002 the FARC-EP
had more than 25,000 fighters, 24 where as the BBC reported that in 2002 the guerilla
group consisted of 16,000 troops. 25 Perhaps a greater contrast comes in Brittain’s
estimation that in 2008 the FARC was comprised of nearly 35,000 combatants, 26
whereas both Isacson and the BBC believe that a more realistic number of current
combatants is around 8,000. 27 Brittain acknowledges the difference; he realizes that “this
number [40,000-50,000] may appear high when compared with popular media accounts
and state sources, but it must be understood that the FARC-EP remained
disproportionately underrepresented for the greater part of the previous two decades.” 28
The diminishing numbers of the FARC-EP came primarily during the Uribe
administration as his father was killed by the guerillas. His personal vendetta against the
insurgency fueled his policymaking as he increased military action towards the
insurgents. 29 The FARC-EP’s growth of the past fifteen years can be “attributed to
continued political and economic repression of the rural population and urban working
poor.” 30 This suggests that if the government does not recognize the legitimate call of
the organization, then, combined with the insurgent’s will, the group will not cease to
fight and will continue to find support.

24

Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, pg. 20
“Colombia Hostage Release: Breakthrough for Peace?,” British Broadcasting Corporation, Feb. 17, 2011
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-latin-america-12491339)
26
Isacson phone interview, Jan. 20, 2011.
27
BBC, Feb. 17, 2011.
28
Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, pg. 19.
29
BBC, Feb. 17, 2011.
30
Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, pg. 19.
25
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The combatants are spread throughout Colombia based on the need from certain
blocs. The largest blocs are the Southern and Eastern blocs. Blocs in central coffeegrowing region, the Magdalena medio region, Antioquia and Caribbean have departments
fewer members because they have had to contend with the strengths of paramilitaries for
more than twenty years. 31

32

Structurally, the FARC-EP consists of seven blocs, in which each has a number of fronts,
on average 300 to 600 combatants per unit. By 2002, it was generally conceded that 105

31
32

Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, pg. 21.
The Center for International Policy, Colombia Program http://www.cipcol.org/?p=601, (May, 28, 2008).
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fronts exist throughout the country.33 As of the late 1990s, the organization controlled
622 municipalities and there is a rigid hierarchy spread from the High Command of the
seven-person-secretariat, to the soldiers. 34 Within their controlled territory, the FARCEP recruits, maintains camps, develops the land for infrastructure and houses a regular
army. 35
According to Isacson, the strong blocs operate in more remote and unpopulated
regions of triple canopy jungles, which allows a separation from the government, and the
populations consist of many rural and peasant people who will follow the FARC-EP. 36
“The guerillas did not represent or fight for the masses, but the insurgency was the
masses.” 37 The transformation into the people’s army in 1982 further emphasizes the
important and basic connection that the organization instinctively holds to the masses.
Thus, their goals will persist beyond the ridicule and libel of the media, U.S. influence
and the Colombian government. Furthermore, the insurgency has had to withstand the
billions of dollars and aid that the United States has funneled into the Colombian
government to combat the supposed “terrorists” or “narco-traffickers.” Yet, while U.S.
and Colombian time, money and resources are geared towards the guerillas, the
paramilitaries see little of the aggression.

33

James J. Brittain, "Columbia’s FARC–EP Defies Imperialist Expansion,” An Independent Socialist
Magazine - Monthly Review, Nov. 26, 2010 (http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905brittain.htm).
34
Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, 16.
35
Chaliand and Blin, 24.
36
Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, 21.
37
Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia, 31.
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38

In an interview between Leech and Josh Rushing, a reporter for Al Jezeera, the
two discuss the term narco-guerillas and narco-terrorists. Leech mentions that the latter
became more commonly used after 9/11 and Rushing comments that “the use of that
word terrorist [can be traced] to 9/11 and [it is interesting to] then see how it is used for
politics and money afterwards.” 39 Leech says, now, due to the War on Terror,
congressional approval is easy to come by when terrorism mentioned, which encapsulates
the idea that the term “terrorism” has lost meaning and become solely a political
mechanism to reduce non-state oppositional powers around the globe. Leech adds that
Plan Colombia is seemingly more of a counter-insurgency plan rather than a counternarcotics scheme. 40 The FARC-EP cannot be grouped with other terrorist groups
because they have “put forth a series of fundamental socio economic reforms and worked
to aid the masses for whom they stand and fight. 41
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In 2006, it was made known the FARC-EP had been providing medical services
in some of the most impoverished slums of Colombia. The guerillas had created
infirmaries capable of supplying surgical operations, medicine and health care
supplies to local civilians. 42
Leech wrote after the death of Jorge Briceño Suárez, who went by Mono Jojoy,
that Mono Jojoy implemented some of the FARC-EP’s most progressive social and
economic policies in order to aid peasants in the rural regions of Colombia. Many of the
small towns under Mono Jojoy’s control were also subject to significant infrastructure
improvements due to the guerillas’ public works programs, such as road construction
between dozens of rural towns. Furthermore, with the aid of FARC-EP’s tax revenue,
Mono Jojoy was able to construct electrical grids in dozens of remote towns and villages
that would be otherwise neglected by the national government while he also oversaw the
redistribution of land to subsistence farmers as a result of agrarian reforms. 43 However,
many of these reforms, movements and projects are overlooked and rarely
commemorated by the government or the media.
While it [the FARC-EP] can be described as ‘the most important military and
political force in South America opposing imperialism’ (Escribano, 2003:299),
Washington prefers to classify the FARC-EP as the hemisphere’s most dangerous
terrorist organization. 44

The Geography and History of Violence
The fall of the Soviet Union, and thus the elimination of foreign aid, coupled
with increasing pressures from paramilitary powers as well as the U.S.-aided Colombian
military pushed the FARC-EP towards more violent and harmful actions. They began to
42
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use land mines, gas-cylinder bombs, hijack commercial jets, assassinate elected officials,
murder peace activists, and they also attacked an upscale family recreation center in
Bogotá killing and wounding many.

45

Such actions created means for the government

and media to associate the insurgency with terrorism. As a result, there have been
reported links between the FARC-EP and other insurgencies-deemed-terrorist
organization such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA). 46 Furthermore, these violent acts
can be contextualized through the investigation of the history of politics in Colombia.
Political scientist, Harvey Kline, argues that peace and politics and Colombia are not
commonly associated with one another.

47

In the 19th century alone, Colombia was victim

to eight civil wars, six of which were direct fights of political opposition: Liberals versus
Conservatives. 48 Kline cites, Fabio Zambrano Pantoja as he said,
The real people, that is to say, the majority of the population, learned politics
through the use of arms before they did through the exercise of the
suffrage…most people were applying the generalized idea that war is the
continuation of politics by other means. 49
The geographical diversity of Colombia is responsible for the creation, since its
independence, of a “political archipelago,” each region consists of increasingly different
needs and lifestyles. 50 Lastly, Kline cites a Colombian Sociologist:
Probably because of the traditional, oligarchic set up of Liberal and Conservative
parties, we [Colombians] never developed peaceful ways to resolve conflict. If
we have disagreements we only think of violence as the way to solve them.” 51
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Regardless of the innate urge towards violence that resonates throughout
Colombia’s politics, four administrations since the 1982 administration of Belisario
Betancur have taken part in Peace Talks with the, at that time, four guerilla groups
present in the country. 52 During the Betancur government, the FARC-EP was the only
insurgency that maintained the truce and cease-fire with the government. 53 After the
failed Pastrana talks, the prospect of a peaceful outcome during the Uribe administration
was crushed. However, due to the recent releases of six hostages, as of February 18,
2011, there is speculation that peace talks could ensue between the insurgency and the
Colombian government. 54 Yet, while speculation circulates, President Santos was quoted
by Colombia’s El Tiempo, “In addition to leaving behind terrorism and freeing all of the
kidnapped people, the guerillas should renounce narcotrafficking to even think of the
possibility of dialogue.” 55 It appears that Santos has pledged a similar tactic to Uribe in
dealing with the guerillas and Colombia’s civil war.
In conclusion, the FARC-EP is a guerilla group working for social and
economic equality with hopes of shared political presence. However, decades have
passed and they have yet to attain any power within the formidable Colombian
government. Thus, the methods of the organization have had to change with the times,
which is partly seen through the rural-based movement’s expansion into urban centers.
Yet, while the organization still holds true to developmental ideals, as “many townsfolk
enjoyed living in the rebel safe-haven because it provided a sense of security and the
52
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ability to create alternative community-based development projects,” 56 adaptation was
necessary for survival.
The insurgency began as a peasant led rural-based land struggle in the 1960s, but
it has since been transformed into a national political-military social movement
illustrating a vision of alternative development through socialist society via armed
struggle. 57
Subsequent chapters will examine how, and why the FARC has transformed from
the leftist guerilla group as it began in 1964 (to be rightfully founded in 1966) to being
portrayed as a “terrorist organization” involved in drug production as it has been named
through mass media, the United States and Colombian governments. This thesis will
look to uncover the accuracy or lack of accuracy of these accusations and depictions of
the FARC-EP surfaced and advocated by the public media and hardline administrations.
It will also dissect the term terrorism and its connotations and meanings that have
developed since its inception during the French Revolution. The hope of this research is
to argue that the FARC-EP has maintained its ideology and continues to fight for social
equality within Colombia and that the label of a “terrorist organization” is not justifiable.
As demonstrated predominantly by Leech, Petras and Brittain “rather than blindly
following the rhetoric of [so-called] ‘experts,’ the mass media, or state-based reports,”
the research and production of this thesis will investigate and promote discussion of the
actions, ideologies and the accomplishments of the guerilla group. 58 Research will
attempt to negate the insinuations that the insurgency has “failed to retain ‘an ideological
vision’ of political organization or the expansion of class consciousness.” 59 Essentially,
the argument will be made that drugs and crime are just means to an end for the FARC56
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EP. Such means have become necessary in order to uphold and maintain power in their
struggle against neoliberal governments that have for decades ignored the rural
populations and communities outside of Bogotá. These marginalized regions have seen
little accommodation from the differing Colombian administrations. Instead, the
government partakes in the violence and refuses to negotiate and compromise with the
FARC-EP and their visions.
The first step towards understanding the complex situation of the FARC-EP lies
in the historical development of the organization. A historical context of the insurgency
illustrates the political, social and economic standings and systems entrenched in
Colombia since colonial rule. Independence in Colombia from Spain did not result in
liberation and equality for all, as it rarely does. Instead, independence meant the power
of the few wealthy, landowners and centuries of Liberal and Conservative power. This
combination resulted in erupted violence and grave socio-economic inequality. As the
gap between the rich and the poor grew along with abuse and bloodshed, the
marginalized persons of the countryside, driven by hope for change, rationalized and
formed Leftist guerilla groups, which would result in the eventual creation of the FARC.
Centuries of struggle and violence serve only as the pretext to the almost fifty year
struggle of the peasant-influenced guerilla insurgency. The subsequent chapter will
introduce the many aspects and obstacles that the insurgency now faces.

CHAPTER TWO

The Violent Past and Present of Colombia

17

In order to understand the cause and fight of the FARC, the social, economic and
political circumstances of the country during the insurgency’s inception will be
uncovered. This chapter will reveal the immense inequality and violence that has
plagued Colombia since colonization and into its independence. Without such context,
the goals and justification of the guerilla army would be lost and unimportant. The
FARC almost fifty years old. The organization has contended with dozens of Colombian
administrations and inevitably social, economic and political changes. The insurgency
has evolved accordingly, and it has likewise encountered present-day enemies and
opposition.
The history of Colombia is a violent, turbulent story. In the 19th century alone,
after Colombia’s declared independence in 1810, there were numerous civil wars and
nearly fifty regional or local conflicts. 60 The source of much of the violence resonates
with the life-long conflict between the political parties of the Conservatives and Liberals.
In 1899, in connection with the U.S. backed fight for Panamanian independence,
Colombia began the Thousand Days War. The inevitable civil war between the dueling
factions persisted until 1902 resulting in the deaths of thousands of citizens and the
secession of Panama; it devastated the country with its ideological battles but to no avail.
The same war and tensions between the parties broke out in violence again decades later
in the period known as La Violencia, which left 200,000-300,000 people dead.
Additionally, lives in Colombia have been further sacrificed due to the current internal
war between the Leftist guerillas, paramilitaries and government’s armed forces. As
Daniel Peacaut, a well-known French student of Colombia’s violence, notes, “party
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identification overwhelmed any other social division…therefore, violence is linked to the
autonomy of politics.” 61 Violence has plagued Colombia due to the colonization and the
implementation of the oligarchy, distribution of wealth, severe geographical differences
throughout the country and the ongoing political opposition. To quote notable
Colombian author and professor, Fernando Guillén Martínez:
The civil wars of the nineteenth century contributed, more than anything else, to
the dysfunction of peasant life, to the destruction of social, moral and economic
importance of the smaller urban centers and to the conversion of the majority of
the population into fanatic bands, whose only hope of survival consisted in
vanquishing the enemy on the national scale, imposing the domination of one
‘party’ over the other.” 62

Brief Colonial History
The roots of Colombian society are based on inequality and violence and so at this point,
a recognition and explanation are developed in order to place the FARC in existence with
the conflicting factors that drove Colombia to violence and decades of internal conflict.
Moreover, Colombia never experienced a new process of state formation after its
independence from Spain, and in consequence, Colombia had a weak central government
and much of the power remained in the hands of the elite classes forming an oligarchic
democracy. 63
After Independence from Spain, Simón Bolívar was elected as President of Gran
Colombia in 1819; Francisco de Paula Santander became his vice president. The
conflicts that erupted between the followers of Bolívar and Santander are consequently
responsible for the creation of the separation and struggle between the Colombian Liberal
61
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and Conservative parties. 64 Bolivar’s supporters later came to form the Conservative
Party, which sought a strong, centralized government, alliance with the Roman Catholic
Church and limited franchise. 65 Conservatives also encourage rural development because
it sees property as a natural right and it is believed that the state should protect
landowners and thus favor taxation on uncultivated land rather than parcelization of large
territories and estates. 66 Followers of Santander created the Liberal Party, which wanted
a decentralized government, state control over education and other civil matters as well as
inclusive suffrage. 67 It is the party of the people; it favors the decrease of governmental
restriction on trade and pushes for a greater role in meeting the individuals social and
economic needs. 68
Colombia began as an export economy based on agriculture. Coffee, tobacco,
cotton and cocao production began to surface and flourish in plantations on the western
slope of the Cordillera Oriental toward the Magdalena River by the European colonizers
predominantly in the 1850s. 69 Coffee as an economic entity coupled with Spanish
colonization and the power of the oligarchy in Colombia serve to be the underlying forces
responsible for the political situation and context in existence today. Charles Bergquist,
Professor Emeritus at the University of Washington wrote, in Colombia, “economic
resources were monopolized by a small upper class interested in preserving its position
and generally unable or unwilling to generate new wealth.” 70 Colonization and the

64

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm.
66
Miles Richardson, San Pedro, Colombia: Small Town in a Developing Society (Illinois: Waveland Press,
Inc., 1970), 17.
67
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm.
68
Richardson, 17.
69
Richardson, 7.
70
Charles W. Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 1978), 3.
65

20

wealth that remained in the hands of a few consequently led to discrimination and
favoring of the city people over the countryside; today, the issue of Bogotá as separate
from the rest of the country remains a rampant and important issue. Bogotá was one of
the early settlements of the Spanish; it eventually became the political and cultural center
of the colony of New Granada. In addition, after Colombia’s independence, the city
became the capital and remains the “residential base of the country’s governmental
apparatus and the home of its intellectuals.” 71

Latin American Populism
In the 1930s-1950s populist governments and figures such as Lázaro Cárdenas of
Mexico (1934-40), Juan Perón of Argentina (1946-55), Getúlio Vargas of Brazil (193045 & 1950-54) and Jorge Eliécer Gaitán of Colombia emerged as a new political force
throughout Latin America. This twentieth century populism varied from nineteenth
century European populism in that it emerged from and combined with the activists of the
working-class, socialists, and social democratic mass movements. 72 Populism inspired
mobilization of the formerly passive and oppressed groups to take part in and voice their
positions to the political establishment. Historian Eric Hobsbawm stated: “European
fascist regimes destroyed labour movements, the Latin American leaders inspired and
created them.” 73 The connection with these more leftist organizations and movements
influenced these leaders, Cárdenas, Perón, Vargas and Gaitán, who never associated
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themselves with trade unions, socialists or leftist ideals, to address more common social
and mass movement issues. As a result,
Their populist influence relied on the mass base that had been forged in the battle
for workers’ rights; matured under the tutelage of socialist, anarchist, or
communist leaders; and relied on the organizational apparatus of left-leaning
political parties.” 74
However, while the leaders seemingly took a public role to address and aid the masses, in
many cases, populist leaders articulated a progressive rhetoric, while actually
undermining the interests of the masses, and ultimately strengthened capitalism and upper
class goals. 75 Though the masses, meaning the middle class, typically supported
populism, it, unlike socialism, encourages and embraces capitalism and does not advocate
for a worker-run state. “Populists use the strength of the state…as a patronage machine
to appease workers and meet the demands of mass movements.” 76 Populism creates a
supportive façade to the masses, yet at the same time the policies that are implemented do
not necessarily reflect the presidential mantras. Populism gradually emerged in Latin
America, in the 1930s, after the vast majority of the countries began to move away from
agricultural and export economies. They began to internalize and move towards importsubstitution industrialization. 77 Although it would appear that the separation from
agricultural economy would create new political powers, the elite classes remained in
power for the most part, even with the appearance of populism and the emergence of the
masses. 78 The “genius” of populism is its ability to manipulate the different classes in
order to appeal and appease to each of them.
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Typically, characterization of Latin American populism includes an urban setting,
a range of socio-economic support, a connection to nationalism, and a charismatic
leader. 79 Steve Stein, a professor, portrays “populism’s ‘central dynamic’ as the
personalistic particularistic ties between powerful leaders and dependent followers.” 80 It
seems that the populist leaders use the faithful followers in order to achieve outside the
goals of the masses. As Brazilian Antonio Carlos Riberiro de Andrada stated in 1930,
“Facamos a revolucão antes que o povo a faca” (We will make the revolution before the
people do). 81 This daunting statement implies that populist governments worked to
control the revolution through political influence and charismatic leaders. Furthermore,
Stein suggests that, “populism was the primary reason why ‘the expected build up of
popular pressures for revolutionary change has not occurred.’” 82

Banana Massacre
Notably, Colombia has not had a successful revolution nor a real movement
towards one; the closest actions may be those of the FARC guerillas. Colombia is in
much need of a revolution and the guerillas fight for many of the same issues present in
other Latin American countries (i.e. land reform and distribution of wealth). The Banana
Massacre of 1928 is an event that encapsulated revolutionary ideas and demonstrates the
masses unrest and desire for change. In the department of Magdalena, on December 6,
1928, United Fruit Company’s workers staged a strike in the train station of Ciénaga.
Thousands of banana workers gathered to demonstrate in hopes of improving living and
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working conditions as well as to see negotiations. However, in return the Conservative
government’s troops fired at the protesters and their families killing hundreds. 83 The
United Fruit Company is a U.S.-owned corporation; it essentially created debt peonage.
The banana workers, bananeros, were “independent workers” forced to sell their crop as
rent for the company land while they were paid in script only redeemable in company
stores. 84 Labor abuses were abundantly visible, so, anarcho-syndicalists and the Partido
Socialista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Socialist Party, PSR) organized to confront the
company that had for years abused the workers’ rights. After the massacre, the conflict
and battle returned to the Conservative and the Liberals. Gaitán used this banana
massacre in order create a strong reputation with the Liberal Party. 85 In 1929 he headed
to Ciénago to initiate an investigation into what happened on December 6, 1928. Gaitán
used the incident to campaign and confronted the people’s frustration with “the
domination of the gringos.” 86
Gaitán, the charismatic leader, used the Banana Massacre as a crutch to appeal to
the masses and win support throughout the country. His populist rhetoric permeated
Colombia and consequently his death left populism and faith in politics dead as well.
The death of Gaitán drove Bogotá and other cities in rubble and parish, and “the nation
plunge[d] into seemingly eternal bloody strife.” 87

Jorge Eliécer Gaitán
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Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was born in 1903 to a respectable lower class family in
Colombia. Yet, he worked his way into elite political circles and into the heart of
Colombian society; he served as Bogotá city councilman, departmental assembly deputy
for Cundinamarca, mayor of Bogotá, congressman, senator, cabinet minister, Education
Minister, Labor Minister and became a primary presidential candidate. 88 After the
United Fruit Company’s Banana Massacre, Gaitán split from the Liberal party. 89 In
response, in 1933, he created his own political movement, the Unión Nacional
Izquierdista Revolucionaria (National Leftist Revolution Union, UNIR). However, in
subsequent years, in 1947, he became the jefe único of the Liberal Party. 90
Gaitán gained respect and praise from the masses in Colombia. He conveniently
structured his image to reflect both his progressive political values and his aspirations of
aiding the poor; he dictated a path to change and thus became the defense and voice of
the pueblo as he bridged the gap between classes. 91 The movement that followed
Gaitán’s prominence, Gaitanismo, has seemingly undeniable connections to populism.
Gaitanismo included members of the capital-owning, commercial, and professional
classes, the political elite, and even rural small holders and landless agrarian workers and
artisans. 92
Although not a socialist, he used the language of socialism to advocate for a more
humane capitalism in which the government intervened to ensure an equitable
distribution of wealth, public education, a decent standard of living and that the
benefits of modern society were available to everyone. 93
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Gaitán can be praised for his inclusion because it covers the social and political spectrum
of Colombia.
The misguided speech and representation produced by the Machiavellian, populist
leaders created an atmosphere of united support seen from all different socio-economic
classes, thus the popularity and dedication particular to the populist leaders was immense.
Specifically, the assassination of Gaitán served as a catalyst to riots, violence, revolution
and social movements. The masses of Colombia took to the streets in rage and rebellion
in reaction to the respected candidate’s death. Gaitán was assassinated on April 9, 1948,
by Juan Roa Suierra, a day that changed dramatically the path of Colombia and pushed
the country into decades of violence and civil war. Immediately following Gaitán’s
death, the assassin was apprehended and killed by outraged Colombians. Riots were
instigated, and Liberals and Conservatives took to the streets of Bogotá. The events
nearly completely destroyed the city, the rampage is known as El Bogotzao. 94 The fight
spread to the countryside where the period known as La Violence emerged and continued
for more than a decade. The riots in Bogotá, following Gaitán’s assassination, led to
peasant land seizures in rural areas, which resulted in severe repression from land
owners; they then hired thugs to force the farmers off of the apprehended territories.
These peasants in turn formed guerrilla armies. 95 The death of Gaitán,
Brought an end to Colombia’s longest period of peaceful political development,
swept away much of the legitimacy of its political class, and completely altered its
political environment for decades to come. 96
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La Violencia began in the subsequent months after the death of Gaitán and the
break out of riots in Bogotá and the countryside: El Bogotazo. The primary source of the
violence resonated with the Liberals and the Conservatives. The Liberals had previously
held political power for sixteen years, until the power was transferred from Alberto
Lleras Camargo to the new Conservative leader, Mariano Ospina Pérez in 1946. 97 The
1948 assassination of Gaitán sparked speculation between the parties. Soon, the
Conservatives, in power, reorganized both urban and rural police in hopes to transform
Colombia. The violence that erupted was atrocious and unfathomable especially as these
acts were committed against fellow citizens. For example, common torture methods
consisted of “picar para tamal,” which meant to cut up the living victim into small
pieces as well as crucifixion, hanging, pushing victims from airplanes (later utilized
during dictatorships in Argentina), children were raped and most disturbingly, some
pregnant victims were given caesarian sections only to have their babies removed and
replaced by roosters. 98 In order to combat such horrors, the Leftist guerilla movement
grew and conceptualized. In 1953, the dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla granted amnesty to
the guerilla fighters in the countryside. Many conceded to the request, but at the same
time those that remained entrenched in the fight created “soviet republics” like that of
Sumapz and Marquetalia, which were areas governed by rebel peasants in the
countryside. 99 Two years later, in 1955, the rebel republics remained and peasant desire
to continue the fight raged, but the Conservatives and Liberals were on the road to
reconciliation with hopes to end the violence. This violence officially ended in 1957
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when Liberals and Conservatives signed a pact to divide political power in order to
establish national unity. 100
Although the political parties subsided, these “soviet republics” in the countryside
raged. Peasants were initially involved in the bloody battle due to the ever-present
political and economic battles between the Liberals and Conservatives, however, in the
end, peasants decided to take their own role in altering the political future of their
country. La Violencia weakened political support in both the masses and the elite, while
it stimulated class consciousness. 101 The resulting peasant “soviet republics” led to the
1960s creation and organization of guerilla groups. “The Marxist have decided that La
Violencia represents the rebellion of the downtrodden masses against the oligarchs—in
other words, the class struggle.” 102 Though the violence emerged as a conflict and fight
between Colombia’s political parties, it resulted in a transformation and presence of
peasant politics.

Marquetalia Republica
In the years following Gaitán’s assassination, radical Liberals as well as
communist guerillas joined to form the Marquetalia Republic. This cooperation of
Leftist idealist coupled with the assassination of Gaitán and the break out of El Bogotazo
is essentially the catalyst to the eventual creation of the FARC. In an interview with a
FARC-EP’s spokesperson, Marco Leon Calarca, FightBack!News uncovers the specific
governmental actions that preceded the establishment of the guerilla group. Calarca
credits the Colombian military’s plan, in cooperation with the U.S. pentagon, Latin
100
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American Security Operation (LASO) or Operation Marquetalia as the event that initiated
the formation of the Leftist insurgency. 103 On May 27, 1964, commanders Joselo and
Isaias Pardo led the Leftist guerillas into battle to defend their republic from the
governmental oppression based on LASO. To the guerillas of the republic, these actions
of the U.S. supported Colombian government rationalized the formation of the FARC. 104
As a result of the conflict, on July 20, 1964 the guerillas set forth an agricultural program
and concocted a fighting strategy. Officially, on May 5, 1966, at the Second Conference
of the Southern Bloc, the FARC was conceptualized and formalized. 105 The FARC-EP
spokesperson details that after the government’s attacks on the republic, the guerillas and
rural farmers discussed the future and cause of the organization.
We all are revolutionaries who fight for a change of the system. But we wanted
and struggled for this change using the least painful path for our people: the
peaceful road, the road of democratic mass struggle, legal roads marked out in the
Colombian Constitution. This path was violently closed to us. Because we are
revolutionaries, who must in one way or another, play the historic role that falls to
us. Forced by the circumstances that I already noted, we are inspired to look for
another path: the road of the armed revolutionary struggle for power. 106
In the end, these campesinos and farmers felt objectified by the government and sought
the next viable option in order to protect their land, lives and rights. They believe that the
violent actions brought on by the government vindicate the guerilla formation based on
military tactics of the FARC.
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Marulanda and the Creation of the FARC
The aforementioned creation of the Marquetalia Republic served as the incubator
to the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the insurgents. From this influential environment,
Manuel Marulanda Vélez, also known as Tirofijo, and Jacobo Arenas emerged as the
founders of the Leftist guerilla group, the FARC. The reason for the formation of the
insurgency remains consistent with the initial goals developed and pursued by the
Republic. To aid the countryside as it suffered from the lack of land reform, increased
violence and discrimination and the constraints of the Conservative party of 1946.
Though both Arenas and Marulanda are credited as the founding figures of the
FARC, Marulanda is more commonly associated with FARC leadership; he was the
Commander in Chief until his death in 2008. Marulanda was of peasant upbringing, a
lower-level employee in public works. 107 By his twenties, Marulanda developed clear
association with Marxism-Leninism and abandoned social-democratic ideology. 108
Later, he became associated principally with communism and became a member of the
Partido Comunista Colombiano (PCC). People mistakenly connect him to the Liberals
because he was born in a rural peasant area where he was influenced by the Liberal and
Conservative struggle as he lived through La Violencia. 109 However, as Brittain
emphasizes, the origins of the FARC are heavily and almost completely intertwined with
the beliefs and ideologies of the PCC and some say radical Liberalism. 110 In the 1930s
the PCC originally called for “social transformation, unionism and the education of the
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working class” 111 while also working for better living and working conditions, thus they
found the majority of their support in rural areas, coffee regions, among landless peasants
and farmers and later the urban working class. 112
The aim of the insurgency and the countryside’s Leftist guerillas from the
beginning was not to militarize and coerce, but rather initiate reform and establish a
governing “coalition with other progressive parties and movements in a multiparty
system in which the centerpiece of socio economic policy will be the equitable
redistribution of wealth and resources.” 113 The FARC gained their support through,
redistribution of land, which called for agrarian reform, their call for nationalism, which
meant opposition to foreign control, their fight for democratization and thus a call to the
end of Liberal-Conservative monopoly of political power and their devotion to
dismantling of the oligarch’s control of the country. 114
This meant, as consistent with Marxist-Leninist ideals, that the organization
automatically set itself up against the foreign power of the United States, which during
the sixties and seventies was already exerting much influence within Latin America. Yet,
despite the strength and influence of neoliberal regimes and their U.S. backers, the
insurgency has maintained its own strength and continued to grow throughout the
decades to become the strongest and largest guerilla group in the Western Hemisphere. 115

FARC-EP Leadership and Structure
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Since the inception of the FARC, over the past 45 years of armed conflict with the
Colombian government, only three of the guerilla group’s seven-person Secretariado
have been killed. Luis Edgar Devia Silva, who goes by the nom de guerre, Raúl Reyes,
died during combat with Colombian Police in Putumayo region near Ecuador on March
1, 2008. José Juvenal Valandia, known as Manuel Jesús Muñoz Ortiz or by his nom de
guerre, Ivan Ríos was killed March 7, 2008 and Víctor Julio Suárz Rojas, known more
commonly as Jorge Briceño Suárez or Mono Jojoy, who joined the FARC at age twelve
to later “commanded the rebel group’s largest bloc, which consists of forty per cent of it
fighters,” was killed September 23, 2010. 116 Founder and leader of the FARC, Manuel
Marulanda Vélez, Tirofijo, also recently passed away on March 28, 2008 due to natural
causes along with two other members of the Secretariado. The few deaths since the
creation of the FARC has allowed for the continuation of the insurgencies original goals
to persist ideologically even though the situation that encompasses the violence has
modernized.
The FARC-EP has complied with Protocols I and II of the Geneva Conventions,
“which stipulate that oppositional armed movements vying for state power must formally
arrange themselves into a visible ranked military construct.” 117 Thus, the FARC-EP has
a very rigid hierarchal system, however, the divisions of power and position do not
prohibit the members from intercommunication. According to Brittain, who spent time
within the FARC-EP, “on a daily basis, the leadership talked with all members on a
variety of issues ranging from camp structure to regional coordination.” 118 The
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organization is led by the Commander in Chief, who is currently Guillermo León Sáenz
Vargas, but goes by Alfonso Cano, who essentially holds all of the decision making
power. He is part of the Secretariado, which consists of seven high-level leaders who
finalize all tactical and political decisions as they consults and influence the Central High
Command. The Central High Command, is made of commanders situated in the six
blocs: Caribbean, Central, East, Middle Magdalena, South and West. These six blocs are
the most common; sources vary on the number of blocs and their names. The blocs
divide Colombia into specific regions in order to ensure control and mobility throughout
the country; each of these blocs is then populated by the fronts. A front can have
anywhere from 40-600 people in it depending on the size of the bloc and the location.
Each bloc and all of the fronts maintain and update all of the information of each member
and it is plentiful and accurate. 119 Today, the Commander in Chief of the FARC-EP is
Alfonso Cano. The secretariat consists of:
Rodrigo “Timochenko” Londoño Echeverri, who goes by Timoleón Jiménez
Luciano Marín Arango, Iván Márquez
Milton “Usuriaga” de Jesús Toncel Redondo, Joaquín Gómez
Jamie “El Médico” Alberto Parra, Mauricio Jaramillo
Jorge Torres Victoria, Pablo Catatumbo
Felix Antonio Muños Lascarro, Pasto Alape
The FARC-EP has remained a prominent organization within the country with
ample support for more then forty years due to the insurgency’s staunch devotion to their
goals and ideologies because of the lack of command change in the secretariat. Though
the group has not yet been able to obtain their goals, dismantlement does not appear to be
a fair or prospective outcome; they have for decades been working to promote their ideals
and better the lives of their supporters.
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The FARC-EP will not “negotiate its demobilization in return for reduced prison
sentences as the paramilitaries have done. Nor will the guerillas demobilize in
return for a full amnesty under a “peace” agreement that leaves the structures of
neoliberalism intact. 120
Due to the FARC-EP’s infinite dedication to their originating goals and causes, it can be
concluded that “any negotiated peace would require a restructuring of Colombia’s
political, social and economic system to ensure a much more equitable distribution of the
country’s wealth and land.” 121 However, Colombia’s dependence and affiliation based
on monetary aid from the United States serves as the ultimate obstacle in the FARC-EP’s
achievement of their institutional goals. U.S. policy to eschew negotiations with
terrorists coupled with the media’s depiction of the insurgency as a terrorist organization
has created little hope for progress and compromise between the FARC-EP and
Colombia’s government in the near future.
The FARC began in the rural, forgotten and underrepresented areas of Colombia
and has successfully been combating the national army. The original fight between the
Liberals and Conservatives as well as inequality and the strength of the oligarchy caused
the construction of the rebel force as it remains today. Guevara describes,
A guerilla fighter as one who shares the longing of the people for liberation and
who, once peaceful means are exhausted, initiates the fight and converts himself
into an armed vanguard of the fighting people. From the very beginning of the
struggle he has the intention of destroying an unjust order and therefore an
intention, more or less hidden, to replace the old with something new. 122
The FARC was created for this cause, violence spread through the countryside as the
people’s needs continued to be denied. A revolution of a sort was seen as the only way in
which progress could be made and the marginalized and suppressed voices could be
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heard. The same powers and parties have ruled in Colombia since its creation, and after a
decade of sheer violence, something new was indubitably the cure that Colombia needed
to find.

Conclusion
To conclude, the FARC emerged out of violence initiated by Colombia’s political
parties of the ruling elite, yet the peasants and masses used the penetration of violence
throughout the city and deep into the countryside as fuel to fight for change. Similarly
with nations around the globe, colonization has left developing nations in ruins,
imbedded with weak, unstable governments. In Colombia, power succeeded from Spain
only to fall unto the wealthy landowners, who had little regard for rural farmers aside
from their cultivation ability of economic commodities. This disregard brought on by the
oligarch created sentiments within the masses to seek separation from the constraints of
Bogotá and the dueling powers of the Liberals and Conservatives. Such violence and
conflict present in Colombian politics serve to rationalize the Leftist peasants and
guerillas’ creation and of the peoples’ army: an army established in the fight for equality.
The following chapter will discuss the aforementioned idea of United Sates’
influence in Colombia primarily in regards to the declaration of the insurgency as a
“terrorist” organization. The issue to be uncovered is how the term “terrorism” is
discussed globally and whether or not the classification is justified. Terrorism has been
altered in past decades. Substantial changes in tactic and ideology behind the military
strategy have ensued and as a result the definition that accompanies current day
“terrorism” has reached an over used and generalized explanation.

35

CHAPTER THREE

The Illusion of Terrorism and Misrepresented Guerilla
Warfare
As the history of Colombia and the FARC demonstrated, there has not always
been a connection between the insurgency and terrorism. The connection is new and
profound as it came as a result of the September 11 attacks against the United States.
This section confronts the accusation against the decades-old insurgency as a new-age
“terrorist” organization. In addition, the falsified label of “terrorist” veers the public
image of the FARC-EP to a negative route and also defers from the organizations original
connection with guerilla warfare.
Terrorism originated in the midst of the French Revolution, however, it has
undergone a rebirth and reconstruction in the years after September 11. Today, the
international community, but mainly the U.S. places the label on almost any organization
that serves to question the status quo. The overindulgence of the terminology has
consequently diminished the power and meaning of the strategy. This chapter examines
the illegitimate notion of “terrorists” that the hard liner governments of Colombia and the
United States have deemed unto the FARC-EP.

Terrorists or Not?
In recent years, the FARC-EP has adopted more violent roles to spread their cause
in order to “upset the civilian economic and social life of [the] adversary state as to force
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negotiations to more equal terms.” 123 Furthermore, the insurgency has moved towards
these aggressive methods in order to gain grounds against the corrupt Colombian
administrations and the militarily trained and backed right-wing paramilitaries. However,
these tactics have consequently upset Colombian administrations and thus the United
States’ government. In return, the hard-liner governments and the media have
strengthened the designation of the FARC-EP as a terrorist organization to further
discredit the insurgency publicly. The FARC-EP serves as a threat to these
administrations because it “seeks to alter the status quo and shake complacent (dominant)
populations or elites out of their complacency. It threatens our comfortable and insulated
everyday lives.” 124 Furthermore, today, the connotation associated with terrorism vilifies
a so-called “terrorist” organization beyond previous measures.
There are two issues that surface in the argument to free the FARC-EP from the
titles of “terrorists” and “narco-terrorists.” The primary issue is the complex and
disputed definition of what constitutes as “terrorism.” The intricacy of the term has
therefore denoted “terrorism” as an unproductive and controversial word that has been
too politicized, used and redefined to hold any legitimate power in the world today.
Secondly, the term has been embedded into global society and has consequently made it
difficult to identify the contrast between terrorism and guerilla warfare.
Generalities and assumptions fill the U.S. formulated criterion that justifies
terrorist designations. The Legal Criteria for Designation of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations by the U.S. State Department reads as follows:
1. It must be a foreign organization.
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2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212
(a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in
section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988
and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage
in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S.
nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the
economic interests) of the United States. 125
Clauses such as the organization must “retain the capability and intent to engage in
terrorist activity or terrorism” present on the Legal Criteria for Designation of terrorist
organizations can potentially denote any group as a terrorist association due to the broad
implications. In addition to this arbitrary classification, the third point addressed under
the Criteria reads, “the organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the
security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign
relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.” The insertion of the threat to
“the economic interests of the United States” unravels the subject to be examined and
analyzed in the subsequent chapter. The section develops the idea that the U.S.
government has named the guerillas “terrorists” in order to protect their oil interests held
by Occidental Petroleum. Furthermore, the resulting actions of U.S. taken to secure their
economic interest have consequently and beneficially funneled money back into huge
U.S. corporations such as Bell Helicopter, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporations and
DynCorp. 126
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History and Evolution of Terrorism
The first issue to be addressed is the complexity of the term “terrorism.” The
matter can be discussed through examination of the history of the tactic. It has become a
broad category used to denounce opposition threats worldwide in order to strengthen the
status quo and current powers. Terrorism has transformed from its original establishment
at the wake of the French Revolution in 1789 as a mechanism of terror used by the state
against the masses, to being associated primarily with non-governmental groups fighting
oppression. 127 However, still, the main clauses in the definition of terrorism are (1) use
of violence; (2) political objectives; (3) the intention of instilling fear in a target
population. 128 As further developed by Ariel Merari, a professor at Tel Aviv University,
the broad definition of terrorism allows for a variety of different events to fall under the
category of terrorism, which thus reduces the power behind the word. Merari uses the
United States’ bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan in 1945 as an example. The
acts were made of pure violence, encompassed with political ends and instilled fear in
every Japanese citizen. Yet, the term “terrorism” is more commonly associated with
insurgent rather than state violence. 129
It is a moral fiction to draw a sharp distinction between resort to force by states
and employment of force by subnational, including terrorist, groups. Both cases
bring death and entail the use of violence. The chief distinction is a surface
legitimacy to the state premised on little more than its greater longevity and
organized control of territory. Thus these varied actors—state and non-state—are
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better judged and distinguished ultimately by the morality of their ends, not by a
priori ‘status’. 130
While terrorism surfaced in the late 1700s, a substantial change in the actions
associated with the mechanism of coercion came in 1878 with the Russian revolutionaries
of “Narodnaya Volya.” These revolutionaries used “terrorism” against political
oppressors in order to surge a revolution of their own through the method of
assassination. Political assassination by means of terrorism continued to be the
associated technique of terrorism for decades. Eventually, this type of terrorism lead to
the initial spark of World War I with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by a
Bosnian Serb student, Gavril Princip, in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. 131 The next
significant change in terrorism came in the years after World War II. New targets
emerged, policemen, local officials and, in some instances, civilians. New tactics
developed consisting of hostage-taking, aircraft hijackings and bombings of buildings. 132
The definition changed dramatically one last time with the actions of members of al
Qaeda in the United States on September 11.
The history of terrorism demonstrates the difficulties that arise in regards to the
ability to distinguish groups as terrorist organizations or not. The terminology is ever
changing and no two groups are the same. A plethora of organizations have developed to
fight a number of different causes. Also, as seen through the formation of the FARC-EP,
the ideology behind the struggle and tactics of the organization is based on the
fundamental desire for social equality. Furthermore, Professor Adam Roberts, Professor
Emeritus at Oxford University, writes that the common quote, “one man's terrorist is

130

Nicholson, 6.
Roberts, BBC, Aug. 27, 2002.
132
Roberts, BBC, Aug. 27, 2002.
131

40

another man's freedom fighter,” which reflects genuine doubts about the term. 133
Roberts further discusses the strife that contends with defining terrorism.
The labeling of individuals and movements as 'terrorist' will remain complicated
and highly political. Two key questions arise: (1) Is it reliance on terror that truly
distinguishes a movement from its political opponents? (2) Even if parts of a
movement have employed terrorist methods, is 'terrorist' an accurate description
of the movement as a whole, made up of many different wings, and employing
many different modes of action? 134
Roberts’ remark directly denounces the over use of the term terrorism and the excessive
classification of opposition forces around the globe. In today’s global society,
“terrorism” has permeated foreign policy, specifically in the United States, in order to
deter ideological foes and to protect economic investment, political relationships and
global power.

Terrorism: The New Communism
As Europe crumbled in 1945 due to the exhaustion of war brought on by the
various fascist regimes, the U.S. was able to sustain growth and prosperity because of its
geographic location and hesitant entrance into the war. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union
emerged from the end of the war as a dueling superpower alongside the United States.
The “two blocs represented the vanguard of radically opposing socio-economic and
political systems, which both sides believed were destined to become globally
universal.” 135 These conflicting ideologies almost completely shaped U.S. foreign policy
for the four decades following the close of World War II, the Cold War.
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The United States spread its power and dominance, not solely to undermine
Soviet influence, but to pressure other states into adopting policies that would
compliment an American vision of how the post-war international economy should
exist. 136 Such policies were implemented in countries that appeared valuable to the U.S.,
weak, or susceptive to communistic rule and worked to dismantle trading blocs that were
set off from American capital. The United States portrayed the fight against communism
to the American people as means of securing American safety, promoting democracy and
aiding the people of the inflicted country and thus justifying any actions against
communism. 137
The economic prominence within U.S. foreign policy, through the guise of
communism, is evident in the instances of Greece, Iran and Guatemala. In 1947, the U.S.
intervened in a civil war in Greece. The U.S. supported the neo-fascists over the Left
simply because of their anti-communism ideals. In Iran, in 1953, the U.S. overthrew
elected Prime Minister Mossadegh because of his intentions to national the British-owned
oil company. The coup placed the Shah in power; he was responsible for 25 years of
oppression, torture and abuse. Lastly, in Guatemala in 1954, the U.S. supported a coup
d’état against democratically elected Jacobo Arbenz. Similar to the circumstances in
Iran, Arbenz had nationalized, which to the U.S. exemplified communism, some of the
United Fruit Company holdings. In both Iran and Guatemala, the underlying reason for
intervention was the protection of economic interests (which can be seen today with
Occidental Petroleum in Colombia). Through the decree of communism, the United
States altered the governments in each of these countries and in each instance replaced
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democracy with violent, capitalist dictatorships. 138 Today, a similar tone is dispersed to
the U.S. population meaning that intervention and foreign policy can be credited to
“terrorism” in order to gain support and deter opposition.

September 11’s Rebirth of Modern Day Terrorism
The switch from the scare of communism to the fright of terrorism did not begin
in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union, but rather it emerged after al Qaeda’s attacks
against the United States in 2001. The large-scale terrorist attacks committed by
members of al Qaeda on New York City’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in
Arlington, Virginia undoubtedly transformed the term “terrorism” into what it is
perceived to be today. These acts of terrorism took the lives of nearly 3,000 people on
September 11, 2001. “In the entirety of the twentieth century no more than fourteen
terrorists incidents had killed more than one hundred people. And until 9/11 no terrorist
operation had ever killed more than five hundred people.” 139 The magnitude of these
attacks has consequently altered the terminology and connotation.
That being said, to reiterate, terrorism has undergone a reformation in recent
decades; today, “terrorism” is a derogatory term embedded with negative connotations
rather than a term for specific activity based on the idea of means to an end. 140 Marc
Nicholson, a retired Foreign Service Officer, poses this question, “Do terrorists’ means
justify their ends,” in his essay entitled, An Essay on Terrorism. There are “terrorist”
movements now and in history based on genuine political goals, which resorted to violent
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tactics because they served as the most effective means available. 141 Historically,
terrorism has been a tool of the oppressed, used by disaffected groups or minorities in
opposition to oppressive, military-backed powers. 142 Yet, the definition of “terrorism”
has undergone too many forms since its appearance during the French Revolution to have
a clear definition today. On the political scene, the over usage of the term has obscured
the legitimacy and significance of the label, and the ambiguous definition can be applied
to almost any violent incident. The determination of which organizations are labeled as
terrorists is effected primarily by politics. The issue presented is that when a term
becomes too politicized, reasoning and truths are skewed in order to legitimize the
allegation.
A direct result of 9/11 and the newly proclaimed fear and label of “terrorism,” in
direct connection with Colombia, came with President Pastrana’s proclamation of the
FARC-EP as a terrorist organization. In February 2002, President Pastrana announced
that rebels would be treated as terrorists “and in that, the world supports us.” 143 Until this
time, the government of President Andrés Pastrana had never publicly referred to the
guerillas as terrorists. 144

It was only after Washington went to war against Iraq and Afghanistan, and the
US-dominated mass media launched a massive and sustained propaganda blitz
labeling all critics and adversaries of US global militarism, that the “terrorist”
label was pinned on the FARC. Under intense pressure from the elite media and
under the scrutiny of the US security apparatus, many otherwise progressive
intellectual and writers caved in and joining the chorus labeling the FARC and
“terrorists.” 145
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U.S. influence when it comes to the designation of terrorist organizations is immense but
not necessarily concrete. The events of September 11 that speared the country’s persona
and faith placed immeasurable emotional and personalized angst on the word “terrorism.”
Thus, after the lives of thousands of innocents were stolen by one ill-hearted
organization, judgment is undoubtedly distorted to create a bias and passion against any
perspective oppositional forces.

Terrorist or Freedom Fighter?
Nicholson discusses the idea that if a terrorist organization is successful in
obtaining its goal, then the leaders and the group itself can then be renamed and accepted
as successful liberators and figures. For example, the African National Congress (ANC)
was created during the apartheid era in South Africa in order to represent the black
citizens and fight for recognition and rights. After decades of pacifism, nonviolence and
community activism, only to be met with brutal state terror, in 1961, the organization
looked towards violence to further their cause. They formed a military wing and targeted
government facilities, the South African military, and some foreign businesses; these
actions allotted them a place on the U.S. State Department’s terrorist list. 146 In 1994,
Nelson Mandela, who strongly advocated for the creation of the Umkhonto we Sizwe, the
armed wing of the ANC, became the president of South Africa. 147 Mandela went on to
win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993. 148 Mandela and the ANC are a perfect example of an
organization that had few options apart from armed actions to meet their goals.
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Seemingly, the main difference between the ANC and the FARC-EP is the cause for
which each group stands. The ANC organized against racially based inequality, an issue
that has been faced and dealt with worldwide. On the other hand, the FARC-EP struggles
against distribution of wealth, which is prevalent still around the globe, especially in
countries like the United States and Brazil. Furthermore, as Roberts notes, in 1987-8 the
United Kingdom and U.S. governments labeled the ANC as “terrorists,”
A questionable attribution even at the time not because there had been no
violence, but because the ANC's use of violence had been discriminate and had
constituted only a small part of the ANC's overall strategy. 149
A similar example in found in that of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The Irish
were oppressed and abused by English powers since mercenaries invaded Ireland in
1169. In 1607, the area known today as Northern Ireland was divided among the English
and the Scottish. 150 Later, religious diversity and minimal rights of the Irish citizens
further ignited tensions within Ireland and consequently lead to the formation of the Irish
Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and the Irish Republican Army. 151 During World War I,
the IRA confronted the British powers and won independence for the Irish Free State,
Éire. 152 Later, the IRA and its chief strategist, Michael Collins, destabilized British rule
with limited means but remarkable organization and tactic. “Their experiment brought
hope to myriad independence movements in Europe and beyond.” 153 In 1969, the IRA
decided to leave violent means behind and move toward politics and negotiations. 154
However, the organization stood divided and consequently the Provisional Irish
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Republican Army (PIRA), also known as the Provos, and the Official Irish Republican
Army (OIRA) were created accordingly as the military and political wings. 155 As the
IRA became more powerful in the 1970s, both the political and militant sides took
actions against the British oppression. The organization bombed locations, organized
hunger strikes, developed campaigns, planned protests, discussed cease-fires and resumed
peace negotiations. 156 However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and
the term “terrorism” became undoubtedly loaded, the IRA noted that they would work to
dismantle their arms and work towards political resolution for Ireland. 157 In the end, in
2007, Martin McGuiness a former leader of the PIRA, was sworn in as deputy First
Minister of the Northern Ireland and thus the prospect of political reconciliation is real
and holds a similar ending to that of Nelson Mandela and the ANC. 158
The examples of the ANC and the IRA demonstrate the first proposed issue of
this chapter: the difficulties of labeling organizations as “terrorists.” They represent the
inaccuracy of the criteria used to designate terrorists as well as the complicity of the term
itself. The second proposed matter plaguing the title of “terrorists” is contingent with the
argument between guerilla warfare and terrorism. Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin,
experts in the field of guerilla warfare, argue that the terms “terrorism” and “guerrilla
war” are unfairly used interchangeably. At this point, guerilla warfare, its origins, tactics,
definitions and specific cases will be identified and discussed primarily through one of
Latin America’s most prominent guerilla figures, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, as well as
China’s Mao Tse-Tung and Vietnam’s Vo Nguyen Giap.
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Contrast Between Guerillas and Terrorists
Guerilla warfare as a military term has been in existence since at least the
commencement of the nineteenth century. Guerilla warfare seems to surface when forces
that have greater numbers attack a nation or group of people and more advanced
technology. 159 Guerilla warfare serves as a tactic to undermine the more powerful party
seemingly obtains the power over the subversive group. However, a noted
transformation in the twentieth century of guerilla warfare is the use of guerilla tactics
internally rather than against an outside unit or power. For example, Mao Tse-Tung, a
Chinese communist revolutionary and guerilla warfare strategist who lead China’s
Revolution, wrote, “our strategy is to ‘pit one against ten,’ and our tactics are ‘pit ten
against one.’” 160 What this means is that guerillas must look for the opportune moments
to attack their aggressors. Mao led the communist Red Army of China, and at its
inception, it was greatly inferior in both size and technology to the state’s White Army,
Kuomintang. The manner in which Mao successfully confronted the superior forces is
through his tactical idea to “pit ten against one.” He would wait until his army had the
advantage and work to isolate the opposition so that his forces could “destroy the enemy
one by one.” 161 In the end, the results of guerilla fighters were due to greater intelligence
and tactic as well as intimate links with the population. 162
Though Mao Tse-Tung and others such as Vo Nguyen Giap of Vietnam were
influential and pivotal leaders of their own guerilla movements, this chapter will
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investigate and detail further into Guevara and his guerilla warfare. The emphasis is on
Guevara simply because of the geographical location between Colombia and Cuba. Che
Guevara said the victory of the Cuban Revolution of 1959 shows “plainly the capacity of
the people to free themselves by means of guerilla warfare from a government that
oppresses them.” 163 Che died a “martyr and a prophet for leftist causes and beliefs.” 164
The story and image of Guevara has been popularized and associated with rebellion and
liberty, but the story and ideology behind Guevara transcends contemporary fashion
popularity. In 1961, two years after the successful overthrow of Fulgencio Batista,
Guevara published a written manual on guerilla warfare. The account, in detail, describes
and discusses the main causes, tactics, methods, means and ideas behind the fight for
liberation and equality based on guerilla strategy. Marc Becker, a historian, states in the
introduction to Guevara’s text that,
Che’s life represents a selfless dedication to the concerns of underclass, a struggle
to encourage people to place the needs of the broader society above their own
narrow personal wishes and desires, and a willingness to make extensive personal
sacrifices to achieve a more just and equable social order. 165
The decade leading up to the Cuban Revolution marked the commencement of
many socialist revolutionary movements in Latin America. The ongoing threat of U.S.
imperialism in countries like Guatemala and Cuba sparked the creation and development
of policy based more on nationalization and agrarian reform. Che Guevara and Fidel
Castro were at the forefront of these changes in Latin America. The success of the Cuban
Revolution in 1959 allowed for Guevara’s creation of the three fundamental lessons of
how to the conduct revolutionary movements in America. First, popular forces can win a
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war against the army. Secondly, it is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making
a revolution exist; the insurrection can create them. Finally, the underdeveloped
countryside of the Americas is the basic area for armed fighting. 166
Furthermore, decades before the eminent threat of terrorism and the proclaimed
attributes of a terrorist organization, Guevara wrote about terrorism and the controversy
that surrounds the topic. 167 He drew a line between terrorism and sabotage. He was
aware of the benefits of sabotage over an enemy, but at the same time, he heavily
emphasized the effects that these violent and deceitful acts would have on the future
relationships between the opposing forces and thus the prospect of reconciliation and
negotiations.
It happens that in a civil war the repression by the government power in certain
towns is already so great that, in fact, every type of legal action is suppressed
already, and any action of the masses that is not supported by arms is
impossible…At any rate, well-managed sabotage is always a very effective arm,
though it should not be employed to put means of production out action, leaving a
sector of the population paralyzed (and thus without work) unless this paralysis
affects the normal life of the society. 168
He continues to discuss sabotage as “one of the invaluable arms of a people that fights in
guerilla form.” 169 Guevara introduces sabotage because it is a tactic that proves
increasingly beneficial when alternative options have been exhausted. Much of
Guevara’s ideology is found throughout the FARC-EP and they way in which they are
organized and operated.
Since guerillas and insurgents often employ the same tactics (assassination,
kidnapping, hit-and-run attack, bombings and hostage-taking) just as known terrorist
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organization do, the connection can be made. 170 However, the FARC-EP does not
kidnap innocent people in hopes to instill fear in the people. Instead, according to the
U.S. State Department, “terrorist groups such as the FARC, the National Liberation Army
(ELN), and other criminal organizations continue to kidnap and hold civilians for ransom
or as political bargaining chips.” 171 Moreover, though exact numbers and lists of
offenses attributed to the FARC-EP are nearly impossible to encounter, the majority of
the attacks associated with the insurgency are directed towards the Colombian Army and
not civilians. However, the majority of the bombings and killings that the media
connects with the FARC-EP emphasize not only attacks against the police and the
Colombian Army but against Colombian civilians. There are in fact many instances in
which both indigenous and Afro-Colombians have been gravely affected by Colombia’s
internal conflict. These acts should be noted and condemned. However, the heart of the
attacks are against the national power.
It is important to highlight the FARC’s infractions against civilians. The FARCEP has been named responsible for the La Gabarra Massacre in 1996 where 34 coca
farmers were killed due to supposed drug related motivations. 172 Another horrific
massacre due to the violence between the AUC and the FARC-EP took place in Bojayá,
Chocó, a department comprised mostly of afro-Colombians. A reported 119 civilians
were killed in the territorial dispute between the guerillas and the paramilitary. 173
Although these massacres are terrible and unjust, the FARC-EP typically targets the
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military and not civilians, however, in reality in any civil war, there are civilian
casualties. For example, common FARC-EP attacks are the destruction of military bases,
like that of Miraflores in southern Guaviare or similar to in 1998 when FARC-EP
combatants ambushed the 52nd counter-guerilla battalion. 174

The FARC-EP True Guerilla Insurgents
Bruce Hoffman, the Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at
Georgetown University and former Corporate Chair in Counterterrorism and
Counterinsurgency at the RAND Corporation, states that guerilla groups typically have a
large number of armed individuals and military hierarchy. They also lead attacks against
enemy military forces, seize and hold territory in order to form sovereign control over a
defined geographical area and its population. 175 While on the other hand, terrorists do
not function openly as an armed unit, generally do not attempt to seize or hold territory,
avoid engaging enemy military forces, have little control over mass mobilization and see
little to no dominance on both local and national levels. 176 Moreover, terrorist groups
focus on lone assassinations or will have a maximum amount of 40-50 people involved in
one mission. Furthermore, guerrillas and terrorists differ additionally in their choice of
weaponry; where terrorist organizations use homemade bombs, car bombs, explosives
etc., the FARC-EP and guerrilla groups use more military type arms like rifles and
machine guns.
According to Hoffman’s, Inside Terrorism, “nearly a third of the thirty-seven
groups on the U.S. State Department’s ‘Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations’ list
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could just as easily be categorized as guerillas.” 177 Aforementioned justifications of the
FARC-EP as a guerilla group allow for the assumption that the Marxist-Leninist group
would fall into the third of the organizations that should be rightfully omitted from the
U.S. State Department’s list.
Additionally, along with the term terrorism, a newly fashioned title, “narcoterrorism” has been applied internationally to further disparage organizations like that of
the FARC-EP. Narco-terrorism, a term developed in the mid 1980s, is typically defined
as, the “use of drug trafficking to advance the objectives of certain governments and
terrorist organizations.” 178 In regards to the FARC-EP, Isacson agrees that the term
unjustly gives the organization a bad name internationally and implies that they do not
have a social base or agenda.

Violent Conclusion
This thesis does not support terrorism, the violence it creates or the deaths it
causes. However, it does examine and understand the differences between guerilla
insurgencies and terrorist groups. Additionally, it examines the legitimacy of the term
“terrorism” as it has been greatly modified, overused and politicized in past years.
Similarly, this research also realizes and acknowledges the history of terrorism and the
reasoning behind means to an end tactics. The discerning acts of the FARC-EP are
condemned and recognized as the killings and kidnappings of innocent citizens should
never be a sought out option for success. However, the existence and ideology of the
guerrilla group are valued. The analysis and research provided by the history of terrorism
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as well as the contrast between guerilla groups and terrorists coupled with recent
insignificance of the term “terrorism” create a base to comprehend and appreciate the
laudable objectives of the insurgency and the means of which they have undertaken to
achieve said goals.
As contextualized by the previous chapter, the history of violence and unjust
governing in Colombia provides a base for the intentions and actions of the FARC-EP.
Violence and corruption are present in the offices of the government and the armies of
the right wing paramilitaries, not just the FARC-EP. In order to compete with opposing
forces while simultaneously increasing support, the insurgency has had no choice but to
intensify their actions. The disputing forces are not innocent and flawless in Colombia,
thus the portrayal of the FARC-EP as a terrorist organization cannot be perceived without
the analysis and description of the government’s armed forces and the right-wing
paramilitaries of the country. A poignant conclusion is that, in retrospect, in comparison
with the dueling powers in Colombia, the FARC-EP is the lesser of all evils. The
intertwined political and economic connections between each of these parties further
emphasize reasons for the tainted reputation of the insurgency denounced by
governmental administrations.
The subsequent chapter will use the material discussed here to open investigation
between the dueling military groups engaged in civil war in Colombia. Right-wing
paramilitaries will be introduced and contextualized as their connection with the
Colombian government is dissected. These paramilitaries along with the Colombian
armed forces are responsible for human rights abuses and scores of extra-judicial murders
throughout the country; total blame for the violent circumstances of Colombia and its
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civil war cannot be solely attributed to the guerillas. Guerilla compliance and peace talks
are another primary topic established at the forefront of the following chapter. The
section also recognizes and investigates U.S. foreign policy and its detrimental affect on
Colombian society, specifically that of the rural farmers and the insurgents fighting for
their cause. U.S. influence towards certain policies and the implementation of Plan
Colombia are discussed as well as the underlying economic ties that accompany the plan.
From these economic ties, U.S. infiltration emerges and as a result, U.S. citizens, Marc
Gonsalves, Keith Stansell and Tom Howes, working for the private contracting company
Northrop Grumman, were kidnapped by the FARC-EP guerillas. This specific event and
their story opens the discussion on the insurgency’s tactic and increasing amount of
kidnappings.
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CHAPTER FOUR

Peace Talks, Plan Colombia and Secuestrados
The FARC developed directly to oppose the status quo. Such a bold move has not
only distressed the government that they openly combat, but consequently, in an
interconnected political and economic world, upset and made an enemy out of the United
States. In return to the rebels’ opposition, the previous chapter discussed the ways in
which Colombian and U.S. administrations have discredited the insurgency. However,
this section uncovers the true, misrepresented reasoning behind the United States’ role in
combating drugs and terrorists in Colombia.
Corruption plagues Colombia, and consequently it hinders the political process
between the guerrillas and the government. Although the FARC-EP has taken part in
peace talks with various Colombian administrations, reconciliation exceeds agendas and
planned negotiations. The United States’ interference and accelerated policies
complicate the relationship between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government. The
fact is that the U.S. does not allocate billions of dollars to Colombia to make the country
safe and ridden of drugs and rebels. Instead, the U.S.’s main interests in Colombia
resonate in economic profit. Occidental Petroleum and the oil fields of Colombia seem to
be the actual motives for U.S. influence and propagation against the FARC-EP that
deems them terrorists. U.S. intervention and policies towards Colombia serve as a tidal
wave of speculation and hidden agendas. Furthermore, the role that the United States
plays in Colombia is responsible for the kidnapping of, in a specific case, three U.S.
contractors for Northrop Grumman.
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Peace Talks and Negotiations
Throughout the history of the FARC and the civil war in Colombia, four
administrations have worked towards negotiations with the guerillas. The process and
negotiations began in 1982 with Belisario Betancur (1982-86). Virgilio Barco (1986-90)
continued talks at the end of his administration and they began again during the first
years of the César Gaviria (1990-94) government. Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) later
reopened the peace talks. However, talks did not continue into President Uribe’s
administration and it does not appear that current President Juan Manuel Santos will
initiate talks either. 179 During these talks and negotiations, the FARC-EP was not the
only organization involved. In the first talks, the Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular
Liberation Army-EPL), the ELN and the Movimiento 19 de Abril (19th of April
Movement- M-19) each took part in negotiations with Betancur. 180 During these talks
with Betancur, the FARC, M-19 and EPL and the Colombian government reached similar
agreements that included,
A cease-fire for one year; the creation of a high-level commission to verify
compliance with the agreement; the granting of a series of juridical, political and
social guarantees to facilitate the transition of the guerilla forces back to civilian
life; and a rehabilitation program for peasant areas affected by the violence. 181

However, both the EPL and the M-19 violated these truces while the FARC remained in
the ceasefire for the duration of their agreement. 182 Furthermore, during the first round
of peace talks with Betancur, the commissioners insisted that the FARC condemn the
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practices of kidnapping and extortion. In return, the FARC insisted that the government
must,
Modernize the political institutions, enable agrarian reform, facilitate the
mobilization of campesinos and indigenous groups, strengthen education, health,
housing and labour policy, establish a policy of public order under the sole control
of the institutional forces of the state and initiate reconciliation processes. 183
The FARC’s active involvement in a series of peace negotiations demonstrates its
commitment and desire to resolve the fundamental issues that urged the creation of the
guerilla insurgency decades before. As Colombia has not seen a revolution since the fight
for independence from Spain, the ideas and goals of the FARC are not uncommon or
outlandish; they can be deemed reasonable and justified. Similar desires have been
revolutionized throughout Latin America and much of the world preceding the inception
of the guerilla group in the 1960s. Years after the first peace talks, in 1993, the FARCEP and its leader and founder, Manuel “Tirofijo” Marulanda Vélez, issued a proposed
agenda for the peace negotiations with the Gaviria administration, in which he outlined
the goals and ideology of the nearly forty-year-old insurgency.

1. A political solution to the grave conflict in which the country is living.
2. A reform of the national military, reducing it to a seize adequate to defend
national borders and sovereignty
3. Political reform through strengthening democratic participation
4. Development and social justice, with private investment allowed in vital sectors
such as energy, communications, public services, roads, ports, and the production
of natural resources, but that the States should remain as the principal owner.
5. Social well-being, with 50 percent of the national budget dedicated to welfare, job
creation, education, health and housing.
6. Income redistribution, though the value-added tax being applied only to luxury
goods and services and with people with higher income paying higher income
taxes.
7. An agrarian policy based on the elimination of large land holdings
8. Renegotiation of national resource exploration contracts with the multinational
corporations, but not nationalization
183
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9. A change of foreign relations though a ten-year moratorium on foreign debt
payments and a revision of military arrangements.
10. The solution to the production and marketing of narcotics with the financial
support of the international community. 184
Marulanda has been the Commander in Chief since the creation of the organization,
which allows for the stipulation that the goals and objectives of the FARC-EP have
foreseen little change. Although methods, techniques and times have changed the
fundamental principles of the FARC-EP remain intact through their armed struggle for
equality. However, it is difficult to attain a current agenda or goals for today’s FARC-EP
with a new leader, Alfonso Cano.

Damage of Plan Colombia
On December 19, 1998, weeks before the first talks between Tirofijo and Pastrana
commenced, Pastrana revealed the intentions of “Plan Colombia.” The plan was
coordinated by Pastrana’s Commissioner Victor Ricardo, and they announced that the
plan would be financed though resources of the state, the private sector and the
international community. It was aimed towards aid for displaced citizens due to internal
violence; aid would be given through legal title to lands as well as through projects
intended to make the land more productive. 185 The planned purpose of Plan Colombia
was to assist small farmers in the substitution of illicit crops in hopes of limiting coca and
heroin poppy production throughout the countryside. Since the plan was proposed weeks
before scheduled talks, Pastrana urged that the guerilla groups should contribute and
adopt the plan “in the interest of a true reconciliation and in order to guarantee the
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success of a fundamental peace process.” 186 Initially, Pastrana envisioned Plan Colombia
as a sort of Marshall Plan for Colombia that would allot large amounts of money to social
programs and education. However, the U.S. government intervened and the program
became a military program that would cause deeper issues within Colombia. 187
Plan Colombia, as it is today, is a billion dollar investment from primarily the
United States to eradicate coca cultivation in Colombia. It was created by the Pastrana
administration in 1998; the initial plan did not involve heavy U.S. and military influence;
however, the Clinton administration altered the initiative to a draft as it remains today
under the Obama administration. The agreement between the U.S. and Colombia in 1998
became a $1.3 billion agreement, less than twenty per cent of which would be spent on
alternative options for the Colombian farmers. 188 The Colombian government would
contest that they provide the campesinos with opportunities beyond cultivating coca and
compensate the growers that chose different means of agriculture. According to William
Brownfield, of the U.S. State Department and former Ambassador to Colombia, those
coca growers that cease to cultivate coca and sign an agreement with the Colombian
government will be provided assistance and support that will allow them to live a decent
life. However, the Mayor of Puerto Aziz, southern Colombia, counters the former
Ambassador’s statement and says,
Two million pesos or 950USD is not enough to live on. A family of five cannot
survive one year on 950USD…what is provided is very little, we think it will be
very difficult for the farmers to stop growing coca if the government doesn’t give
them proper assistance. 189
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James H. Williams of the U.S. embassy in Bogotá states that the Colombian
government and the U.S. are collaborating in order to reduce production of cocaine and
trafficking in Colombia. He mentions that the governments provide an alternative to
traditional coca growers and offers “a genuine economic alternative that is
environmentally sound and economically viable.” 190 What the government suggests
instead is the cultivation of yucca, pineapple and other crops. However, these small
farmers do not have the means to transport their crops nor can they compete with the
other economies, which is why many continue to grow coca and work with the
guerillas. 191 The truth is that the rural farmers and workers live in abandoned areas, have
no economic opportunities and are all but forgotten by the government. “Hundreds of
thousands of farmers driven to poverty by the international agro-business competition
have been hired by the traffickers.” 192 These are the exact reasons why the FARC was
formed initially and why they still work to aid the farmers when the government’s plans
fail.
In addition, Plan Colombia not only fails to provide the campesinos with other
viable, lucrative alternatives, it spreads danger and disease through the herbicides that
contractor companies are hired to spray on the coca fields. However, coca fields are not
the only locations that are hit with the toxic herbicides. Farmers have reported that their
personal crops such as yucca and banana as well as local fish populations are affected by
the spread of the toxins and fumes. 193 Moreover, U.S. Congressman, Jim McGovern (D,
M.A.), believes that aerial fumigation is a human rights violation. This contention is
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supported by Dr. Theo Colborn of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), who argues that
there has been a definite increase in skin disease in the Colombian regions hit by
Monsanto’s chemical, Roundup Ultra. 194 The effects due to the deadly chemicals of
Monsanto have been seen not only in Colombia, but in Brazil, Ecuador and Peru as well.
In 2002, the U.S. State Department reported that there are no harmful effects from the
pesticides on the people and the herbicides do not pose health risks.195 Moreover, Dr.
Colborn confirms that glyphosate, or Monsanto’s Roundup Ultra, can cause tumors in the
thyroid, pancreas and testicles. Further studies have shown that the glyphosate interferes
with the enzyme systems in the thyroid, liver, pancreas and the brain. 196 According to
studies conducted by Colombia’s national human rights ombudsman in 2001 and 2002,
the spraying glyphosate has both killed the legal crops within communities of southern
Colombia as well as caused health problems due to inhalation and contact with the
chemicals. 197 She observes the comparison between Colombia and the herbicides that
were sprayed in Vietnam by the U.S. during the Vietnam War, that are now linked to
child mutations and chronic illnesses.

Plan Colombia or Plan U.S.A
Noted linguist and professor Noam Chomsky questions in the documentary Plan
Colombia: Cashing in on the Drug War Failure, what gives the United States the right to
intervene and take actions in other countries. He alludes to the comparison; if another
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country were to spray herbicides on U.S. citizens’ fields there would be an uproar. 198
Yet, the United States has a long history of intervention in foreign countries. While the
government will argue and maintain ethical and social motivations for intervention, in
reality much of U.S. foreign policy can be connected to economic purpose. As author
and expert on American foreign policy, William Blum says, U.S. foreign policy is based
on “making the world safe for American corporations, enhancing their financial
statements, and preventing the rise of any society that might serve as a successful
example of an alternative capitalist model.” 199
Conveniently in Colombia, the “War on Drugs” is the scapegoat for U.S.
influence and creation of Plan Colombia just as terrorism serves as the justification for
war against the FARC-EP. The U.S. State Department will sustain that the military aid,
training, money and resources appropriated to the Colombian government are issued for
the feat against drugs. However, in both the documentary Plan Colombia and Josh
Rushing, of Al Jezeera’s Fault Lines, interview with Leech, it is concluded that the
counter-narcotics war in Colombia is more of a counter-insurgency battle. 200 Evidence to
legitimize this statement lies in the number of drug fields that are sprayed in guerilla
territory versus the amount sprayed in paramilitary lands. 201 The paramilitaries, namely
the AUC’s, known connections with the Colombian government liberate them from the
unjust and dangerous herbicides that are spread over the poor, rural coca farmers of the
countryside. Further conclusion and debate over Plan Colombia lies in the economic
reasoning and reliance that the United States has in Colombia and its oil wealth.
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As of 2002, the annual sales of Occidental Petroleum Corporations, which is one
of the largest U.S.-based oil and gas multinationals, were $14 billion and the annual net
income was $1.2 billion. 202 Oil is a premium commodity in Colombia. In 1983,
Occidental discovered the Caño Limón pipeline; it is the second largest oil field in
Colombia and one of only fifty billion-barrel-class fields in the world. 203 Occidental's
share in Caño Limón alone yields hundreds of millions of dollars annually. The primary
concern of the U.S. is to maintain control of the pipeline and oil fields. However,
hypothetically speaking, if a Leftist-guerilla group were to gain power or control of the
Colombian government, then there is the possibility that the oil industry within Colombia
would be nationalized or severed from U.S. control. Thus comes the intervention and
abundance of aid from the United States to Colombia; in 2002 Colombia received the
third highest amount of aid from the United States after Egypt and Israel. 204

U.S. Intervention
Similarly, in Chile the threat of nationalizing the copper industry erupted in the
midst of the Cold War. However, under the guise of fighting communism, the U.S.
government justified their intervention and eventual facilitation of a harsh dictatorial rule.
Democratically elected President Salvador Allende’s fight for nationalist movements
created concerns for the United States and in turn the Nixon administration utilized
propaganda and manipulation in order to gain economic control within Chile through the
common legitimization of the fight against communism. The United States identified
Allende’s call to nationalize Chile’s copper industry and prospective land reforms as a
202

http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/colombia/corporate.html#1
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/colombia/corporate.html#1
204
Plan Colombia: Cashing in on the Drug War Failure
203

64

step towards communism and thus intervened based on national interest and security. To
the U.S., the imminent threat of communism justified its right to promote capitalism
abroad. However, in reality even though Santiago had relations with Havana and
Moscow, it was still a weak constitutional coalition and it did not seek ties with Soviets
like the ties that they had with Havana. 205 Nevertheless, the United States saw an
opportunity to use their foreign policy tactics to further expand capitalism and protect
U.S. investments that would otherwise be threatened by nationalization.
The Chilean economy was based on copper, yet the country did not have control
of the resource; ownership rested mainly in the hands of two United States companies,
Kennecott and Anaconda. Thus, when Allende took power, he and Congress in 1971
unanimously voted to nationalize the resource so that benefits could be seen at home
instead of abroad. 206 The United States inserted power and influence within the country,
in order to push the country to free-market ideals. The U.S. did this through means of
coercion and through aid that led to the instillation and military coup of General Pinochet
in 1973, and all because of the threat of losing the profit of the copper industry. 207
In the end, capitalism spread and Chile became a free-market economy. However
it came at a price of thousands of murders and disappearances issued by the dictator,
Pinochet. Soon thereafter, to further aid Chile in its quest for capitalism, famed
economist Milton Friedman flew to the country to discuss how to deal with inflation and
policies that would support and promote a free-market economy. He stated that, there is
an “inescapable link between free markets and freedom,” while stressing that a repressive
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government and a free economy do not generally coincide. 208 Once the U.S.-backed
general assumed power, he and his administration looked towards the “Chicago Boys” in
order to jump-start a new economy based on free-market ideals and to also push it further
away from Leftist-elected Allende’s policies. The “Chicago Boys” were Chicagoeducated economists from Chile that helped bring what they had learned at the Chicago
School of Economics to Chile to stabilize a U.S. friendly economy. 209 This tangent and
comparison in Chile illustrates the common relationship that the U.S. holds with many
Latin and Central American countries. A similar issue persists in Colombia in regards to
the Leftist FARC-EP and the oil industry. The eminent threat of nationalization and
limited U.S. benefits scares the U.S. government, and thus the “War on Drugs” and fight
against terrorism are heavily implemented and pursued in Colombia.

United States Economic Protection
In 2002, the United States’ budget for the war on terrorism and the defense of
national security was $27 billion. Of that amount, $35 million was allotted to
counterinsurgency activities in Colombia, the U.S. was also granted authority to use the
aid for counternarcotics as well as counterterrorism in Colombia. 210 However,
controversy arises around the fact that the U.S. gives millions of dollars in aid to
Colombia even though the government and military units are involved in extrajudicial
murders or “false-positives,” today. These are murders of civilians that are later
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presented as guerillas killed in combat. 211 In recent years, the Colombian Supreme Court
began investigations based on accusations against members of the Colombian Congress
and their collaboration with the paramilitaries. For example, as previously discussed,
currently in Colombia persists the matter of the “parapolitics” scandal where more than
eighty members of Uribe’s Congress are being investigated. 212
In addition, under the Leahy Amendment, named for Senator Patrick Leahy (D.,
V.T.), the U.S. is prohibited from funding foreign security units in nations that have had
reported human rights abuses. 213 Yet, the President has the authority to waive the
amendment if the conditions at hand will affect U.S. national security; both Clinton and
Bush waived the amendment regardless of the fact that there were a minimal amount of
changes in the human rights abuses. 214 According to the Internal Displaced Monitoring
Centre, today, Colombia has between 3,303,979 and 4,915,579 internally displaced
persons (IDPs). 215 This statistic does not include intra-urban displacement or the people
displaced by crop fumigations, and it is derived from the government’s cumulative
figures since 2000. 216 As of 2008, Colombia had the third largest population of
internally displaced people. 217 According to Refugee International, nearly 200,000
persons are displaced a year in Colombia due to the armed internal conflict. The ultimate
goal of organizations like Refugees International is to aid these citizens in a return home,
however, much of the time it is neither sustainable nor safe to go back. The situation of
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the displaced people is further escalated due to the lack of government support. 218 The
people who are primarily affected by the violence of both the guerillas and paramilitaries
are the rural campesinos as well as the indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations. 219
Once the families are displaced, they search for undesirable land to set up camp. The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that IDPs end up
living in slums in the periphery of large cities, which lack basic services. For example,
outside of Bogotá alone there are tens of thousands of IDPs in the shantytowns of Altos
de Cazuca and Altos de Florida. In these barrios there is little access to health, education
or decent housing nor do those affected people have money or a place to live. 220 Ongoing violence between the guerillas and the paramilitaries is the primary cause for the
IDPs in Colombia. In many instances, guerillas and paramilitaries threaten and coerce
populations into supporting their respective group. If the towns do not comply they do
see the consequence.
In spite of human rights abuses and huge amounts of IDPs, the Bush
administration requested that Colombia receive over $500 million in addition to the aid
already designated to the “War on Drugs.” 221 Evidence points towards U.S. economic
investments in Colombia as the reason for the increased amounts of aid as well as the
constant intervention and politics between the two nations. The economic ties come
primarily from the Caño Limón oil pipeline located in the eastern Colombian province of
Arauca, in which the American company Occidental Petroleum holds many shares. In a
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2002 budget proposal to Congress, Bush requested that approximately $100 million be
spent on training and equipment for new Colombian army brigades to protect the
lucrative pipeline. 222 The pipeline is, along with military bases and units, a major point
of attack for the Leftist guerillas in Colombia. The pipeline has been targeted by both the
FARC-EP and the ELN over one thousand times in the past 25 years. 223 The majority of
the oil is exported to the United States and turned into profit. The influence of the U.S. in
the oil industry in Colombia has similar aspects and correlations with that of the copper
industry in Chile of the 1970s. The documentary, Plan Colombia: Cashing in on the
Drug War, concludes that the heavy influence and U.S. role in Colombia is primarily
based on economic profit. However, the U.S. maintains legitimacy by the declaration of
a war against drugs, terrorists and insurgencies. Furthermore, their fight against the
guerillas is beneficial because the fall of the insurgency would eliminate the prospect of
the nationalization of the oil industry if the FARC-EP were in fact able to gain a position
in the government. In conclusion, the fight and vilification of the Leftist guerilla group is
no more than a plot to reduce the chance for a non-capitalist government to come into
power in Colombia and thus gain control of the oil export.

U.S. Profit and Personal Accounts
Unfortunately, economic and political matters appear to overpower the social
aspects of Plan Colombia. Not only have we seen how the United States has intervened
in Colombia in order to protect its assets in oil, but the implementation of Plan Colombia
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itself has allowed for billions of dollars to be funneled back into U.S. corporations such
as Monsanto, Northrop Grumman, Bell Helicopter Textron and Sikorsky Aircraft. 224
According to William Hartung of the World Policy Institute, “it is not so much an aid
program as much as another way to subsidize the military industrial complex in the
United States.” 225 Furthermore, the privatization of the war on drugs is due to the lack of
support by the public. Former Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld “suggests that it is
more economical to use contractors, rather than regular troops, because the army is
stretched beyond capacity.” 226 Isacson contributes in the documentary Plan Colombia:
Cashing in on the Drug War that no European or Latin American country supports the
U.S. role or strategy issued by Plan Colombia. In the end, the influence and role of the
U.S. along with the powers of the Colombian government are not exactly as they seem,
instead, “Plan Colombia is more counterinsurgency than counternarcotics.” 227
The ever-present influence and intervention of the United States is responsible for
the abduction of three U.S. contractors, Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell and Tom Howes,
by the Colombian insurgents. The three men worked as a drug surveillance unit for
Northrop Grumman, a global security and private, multinational defense corporation; it is
the fifth largest in the United States as it works to fight drugs in Colombia. 228 The
company works with the United States’ government to survey drug areas as well as to
spray herbicides over the coca fields in Colombia. Gonsalves, Stansell and Howes were
“mostly looking for coca fields and drug-processing labs under the control of the
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principal revolutionary forces in Colombia, the FARC.” 229 These flights and surveillance
were initiated during the Pastrana administration in accordance with Plan Colombia,
which was created in 1999. 230
While this thesis has thus far favored the FARC-EP, the story of the three
American contractors who crash-landed in the jungle sheds a different light on the
insurgency, an image in accordance with the favored portrayal depicted by the hardliner
governments. The vivid retelling of the three American contractors for Northrop
Grumman, who were captured by the FARC-EP through Out of Captivity: Surviving
1,967 Days in the Colombian Jungle confronts an assortment of issues and gives detailed
scenarios of life as a hostage to a rebel force in the Colombian jungle. The trio spent five
plus years in the Colombian jungle and countryside at the hands of the guerrillas; they
were subjected to extreme living conditions, were forced to wear chains, were
malnourished, forced to march for weeks and saw minimal and inadequate healthcare.
On July 2, 2008 the three men along with Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid
Betancourt and eleven other hostages were rescued. There is no doubt that Gonsalves,
Stansell and Howes were tried physically, mentally and emotionally for years as their
future lay in the uncertain hands of the FARC-EP. 231
The written memoir of the three men is a compelling and remarkable story that
evokes sheer emotion and clearly depicts and arouses true images of their pain and
suffering, especially through the scenes where they discuss the importance of the radio.
In Colombia, there are radio stations that for hours play only messages from family
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members of kidnapped persons to their missing loved one. Yet, while sympathy is the
only feeling that the thesis directs towards the victims, criticism can be placed on the
corporations and the governments. As previously discussed, the actual motives and basis
for U.S. intervention and implementation of Plan Colombia are seemingly skewed by
economic entities. As a result, private contractors are sent into Colombia to eradicate
farmlands of peasants trying to make a living under the pretense that campesinos provide
for and fuel the drug trade. One quote from Out of Captivity: Surviving 1,967 Days in
the Colombian Jungle suggests a direct lack of knowledge from the men and women who
are sent to take part in such a large-scale plan. In a section written by the youngest, Marc
Gonsalves, he tries to discredit and belittle the youth that follow the guerillas, but instead
he demonstrates his own innate ignorance of the vastness of the complexities that
encompass the guerillas’ struggle in their country. He says,
We ran into our own ¿quién sabe? when we tried to imagine what these young
men and women’s lives had been like, how bad the conditions of their existence
must have been to make them think that joining the FARC was a step up. A few
of them we asked told us the same reason for having joined the guerrillas: “la
violencia.” They didn’t go on to explain what violence had been done to them
personally, and we wondered if maybe they mean that they enjoyed being able to
inflict damage on other people.” 232
While it is understood that a memoir written by hostages of the guerrilla group would be
negative and would condemn the organization to its roots, the Colombian and U.S.
governments do not have the same emotional strife to legitimize their active vilification.
The U.S. dedication and involvement in Plan Colombia and aid in general to Colombia
exemplifies why both Colombian and United States administrations defame the guerilla
insurgency, the FARC-EP. United States’ investments and interests in Colombian
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resources and economics serve as fuel to vilify and publicly denounce the Leftist
insurgency.
At this point, we have seen how the history of Colombia has shaped the violence
that still exists today. The battle between Liberals and Conservatives can be argued as
the catalyst behind the undeniable connection between violence and politics.
Furthermore, this violence brought forth a cause for Leftist rebels to fight. Emphasized
through the political and economic connections between the United States and Colombia,
it has been demonstrated that the FARC-EP has not been easily categorized as a
“terrorist” organization based on designated credentials or justifications. The following
chapter will tie each of these chapters on history, terrorism and U.S. influence together in
order to asserts an argument on the falsities of the label of “terrorist” associated with the
FARC-EP.
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CHAPTER FIVE

How will the FARC-EP Fair?
As Colombian journalist and author of Country of Bullets: Chronicles of War,
Juanita León acknowledges in her book, the “true” story behind events can be hidden,
waiting to be uncovered. She also alludes to the fact that the truth lies within the people
of Colombia, the thousands who are affected by the armed conflict daily, rather than
mainstream newspapers and public media, which denote the conflict with a political
emphasis and charge. This concept completely encapsulates the civil war and strife that
has for decades plagued the country. As this thesis has demonstrated, simplicity is not a
characteristic that follows the many relationships or labels that media and countless U.S.
and Colombian administrations have designated unto the FARC-EP.
It has also worked to demonstrate a great spectrum of opinions on the guerilla
insurgency. Through personal accounts of kidnapped persons like that of the United
States contractors for Northrop Grumman, and in León’s retellings of affected people
throughout Colombia, the thesis accounts for the negative, abusive and unjust actions of
the FARC-EP. In addition, former Leftist guerilla groups such as the ELN as well as the
wrong doings of the right-winged paramilitaries and the Colombian armed forces are
addressed. In comparison, staunch believers and Leftist sympathizers found in James
Brittain and James Petras develop the perception of the FARC-EP as the marginalized
and oppressed forces of the countryside that have nobly joined together to protect the
interests of the people.
Common rhetoric and discourse surrounding the rebels has long been established
in order to protect political powers while simultaneously discrediting the insurgency.

74

The FARC-EP has been labeled “terrorists” and “narco-terrorists.” Such accusations
have warranted U.S. intervention and harsh polices to suppress the insurgency and its
campesino combatants. The struggle nears its fifty-year mark and the government still
has not reacted to the circumstances of the rural poor in Colombia. Consequently, the
rebel force continues to transform with the times to maintain powers within the country.
In response, the government has further demonized the organization and since the Uribe
administration of 2002 peace talks and negotiations have been halted and condemned.
The ensuing civil battles between Leftist guerilla fighters, right-wing
paramilitaries and the Colombian government have ravaged and intimidated the country
for decades. However, today, the Colombian and U.S. governments easily classify the
initial peasant uprising and the formation of the FARC as terrorism. Present accusations
are reliant on media portrayal and the random incidents and actions of the FARC-EP; the
media and the government seemingly omit the context of the violence in Colombia while
discussing the role of the FARC-EP. This unjust classification and vilification of the
insurgency is what influenced the research on the root of the conflict. The conflict did
not begin with guerilla attacks on the armed forces or civilians, but instead it surfaced as
a clash between Colombia’s political powers of the Liberals and Conservatives.
The incorporation of the chapter discussing history serves to uncover the origins
of violent politics and inequality in Colombia. In the mid nineteenth century,
independence from Spain left the power still in the hands of the wealthy landowners and
consequently rural poor were left marginalized and oppressed by politics and Colombian
society. After violence erupted and the poor saw more abuse, need for revolution and
change was abundant. Thus, the Marquetalia Republic organized to fight U.S. and
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Colombian forces and later served to form the FARC in order to further their struggle
against such powers. These actions of the Colombian and U.S. governments coupled
with the disregard for the lower class population legitimized the creation of a resistance
force. However, a “resistance” force or and organization that directly confronts the status
quo automatically falls into a combat zone of hardline governments. As a result, the
initial war against the guerillas was valid under the pretense of the “War on Drugs” and
today the battle to dismantle the FARC-EP is masked by the “War on Terrorism.”
There has seemingly been a surge in international press coverage of the FARC-EP
in recent months. Perhaps it can be attributed to the deaths of prominent figures in the
organization, the global political climate, the release of hostages or new means for
FARC-EP income. However, news sources in Colombia have updated stories on the
FARC-EP almost daily. Specifically, Bogotá’s newspaper El Tiempo, on March 21,
2011, reported on a link between the rebel insurgency and Muammar Gadhafi. 233 Libya’s
Gadhafi is currently the center of attention as the harsh dictator of Libya who shows no
mercy to his own citizens. Gadhafi’s oppression of his own people has warranted the
actions of the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Furthermore, reports have not only linked he FARC-EP with Gadhafi but with Daniel
Ortega of Nicaragua as well. Ortega led the Sandinistas to overthrow the dictatorship of
the Somoza family. As a result, the Reagan administration vilified Ortega primarily
because of his differing views. In conclusion, it seems that the sole purpose for the
resurfacing of these accusations, previously reported in 2000, about the links between
Gadhafi and the FARC-EP is to connect the insurgency with negative figures in hopes of
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further discrediting their image and cause. Gadhafi serves as a current day example of
how the media works to manipulate the global representation of FARC-EP.
This thesis examined how and why the FARC has transformed from the Leftist
guerilla group as it began in 1966 to being portrayed as a terrorist organization involved
in drug production as it has been named through mass media and the past administrations
in the United States and Colombia. Research accompanies the argument that opposition
forces to the FARC-EP have publicly and internationally demonized the insurgency
because it poses a threat to the state. History shows that the insurgency began to pursue
this exact path: to speak out against wealthy landowners and to give a voice to the
exploited and forgotten. Instead of cooperating and compromising, countless Colombian
administrations have silenced the call for equality. As a result, violence runs rampant
throughout Colombia on all sides of the conflict. Research concludes that civil war in
Colombia cannot place a “good” or “bad” label on the guerillas; history and current
political situations confuse and complicate the fight and struggle. In addition, economic
prospects and international intervention further deepen the battle between the FARC-EP
and Colombia’s government. It is hard to grasp the complexities of the internal battles
within Colombia based solely on media coverage and U.S. and Colombian propaganda.
In conclusion, the image of the FARC-EP is not fairly depicted and can only be so with a
contrast between the other conflicting armed forces within Colombia. Since these
comparisons are not prevalent, it is easy for the United States and Colombia to illustrate
the FARC-EP publicly in a light that is beneficial to their political and economic goals.
In the case of the Leftist guerilla organization of the FARC-EP it is the perception and
label of “terrorists” that keeps them suppressed and demonized.
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